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I. INTRODUCTION;
Both the ancient Roman and the contemporary American Tort
Law know a type of damages that is not intended to compen-
sate plaintiffs for the harm they suffered but serves as a
punishment to the tortfeasor.
In American law, the courts can award two distinct
amounts of money: First, compensatory damages as a redress
for the plaintiff's actual loss, 1 and additionally, in
cases of aggravated circumstances, punitive damages as
punishment and deterrence. 2 The ancient Roman Law knew even
more extreme forms of remedies
.
Can one track a trend to abolish punitive damages in
both ancient Roman law and contemporary American law?
In both legal systems there is (was) a trend to restrict
them, most obviously in the United States with the discus-
sions whether punitive damages were "A relic that has out-
lived its origins," 3 the states' efforts in the 1980s to
put caps on punitive damages and to enhance the requirements
for awarding punitive damages and recent efforts on federal
level to restrict them at least in product liability cases.
including medical expenses, loss of earning capacxty and pain and
suffering
.
2 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages §733 (1988)
3 James B. Sales and Kenneth B. Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That
Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 Vand . L. Rev 1117 (1984) .
Does that mean that - as a rule - legal systems tend to
provide harsh and strict remedies in their earlier stages?
And that they abolish them in favor of mere compensation
when they reach a "more civilized" stage?
If it turns out that the punitive element vanished in
both systems when they reached a more developed stage, the
conclusion may be permissible that this is necessarily so,
that it has to be so in all cultures, even because those two
systems are so different from each other.
I will conclude that this is not so, that in both legal
systems there are trends to restrict the punitive element
but that it has not been totally abolished in Roman Law and
that U.S. cases show that the notion of punishment and
deterrence plays an important role in the reasoning of
courts when dealing with punitive damages in practice.
II. ROMAN LAW PART:
A. Basic question:
When examining the Roman Law, my basic question is: Can one
track a development from blood-feud to talionic punishment
as a remedy for torts and from talionic punishment to the
payment of an amount of money, first punitive and later
merely compensatory? To avoid confusion I will first define
these terms.
B. Definitions:
a) Blood Revenge:
Blood revenge is a type of self-help. An injury is reacted
upon by "beating back", taking revenge. This is not neces-
sarily restricted to the two persons that initially are
involved into the event. For example, if Mr. David beats Mr.
Goliath and Mr. Goliath beats back, it may well be that next
time, when Mr. David has his whole family with him when he
meets Mr. Goliath, the whole family will beat up Mr.
Goliath, whose family might in turn take revenge to the
whole David family.
The characteristics of blood- feud can be summarized as
follows
:
- There is no recourse to legal proceedings.
- The whole occurrence is potentially limitless. More people
than the original actors might be drawn into the process;
very likely no settlement will ever be reached.
- Mr. Goliath's initial injury is not made good. 4
b) Talio:
The word "talio" derives from "talis", "of the same kind".
The notion is known from the Bible: "An eye for an eye, a
tooth for a tooth." 5 The injury to the victim is mirrored
in the punishment of the tortfeasor.
- There can be, but need not be, a recourse to legal
proceedings
.
- The remedy is restricted to the tortfeasor and it is
restricted as to its extent.
- Like with blood-feud, victims are not compensated for
their injuries.
^
4 One might object that the social position of the Goliath family might
eventually be weakened by a permanent injury to Mr. Goliath and that the
revenge would therefore serve the purpose of restoring the balance of
power between the two families. But even if the injuries sustained by
both sides by chance are of the same extent, one has to distinguish two
injuries here: First, the physical injury itself and second the
consequential damages to the power status of the victim's family. The
latter one may by chance (though not necessarily) have been made good by
the revenge, but the first one still is uncompensated.
Likewise, the "satisfaction of having taken revenge" is not a genuine
compensation as with monetary compensation. In the case of monetary
compensation, the plaintiff 's loss is, as far as possible, offset by an
affirmative financial benefit and additionally the plaintiff might be
satisfied that the tortfeasor suffered a loss by the payment, whereas in
the case of revenge this satisfaction is the only thing the plaintiff
gets for the physical injury.
5 Lev. 24:17-21, see also Exodus 21:24-25.
6 See supra note 4
.
c) Payment of Damages:
In contrast, if law provides for the payment of damages, the
victim of a tort gets an affirmative financial benefit. This
benefit constitutes at the same time a loss to the tort-
feasor.
If the damages merely offset the disadvantages to the
victim by the tort they are compensatory. This is so even in
the case of damages for pain and suffering, though unlike
with out-of-pocket expenses we can not create a status quo
ante. But the increase in wealth can offset the emotional
harm as far as it is possible to compensate for emotional
harm at all.
If a part of the damages exceeds the amount of the harm
done, this part is punitive. Punitive damages are awarded in
cases of aggravated circumstances, if the conduct of the
tortfeasor was "outrageous" or "in conscious disregard of
the interests of others," 7 "malicious," 8 "willful or
wanton, "9 that is, in situations, in which there is a spe-
cial need for punishment and deterrence.
This can be summarized as follows:
blood-revenge merely punitive, unlimited
talio merely punitive, limited
payment of damages with a punitive element
payment of damages solely/ mainly compensatory
7 Restatement (second) of Torts § 908(1) and (2) (1977) .
8 Cherry-Burrell Co. v. Thatcher, 107 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1940).
9 Bull v. McCuskey, 615 P. 2d 957 (Nev. 1980); Sebastian v. Wood, 66
N.W.2d 841 (Iowa 1954)
.
C. Is there Evidence for Blood Revenge?
Since written evidence about the time before the Twelve
Tables is very rare, we have no direct evidence about blood-
revenge. But it might be possible to draw conclusions from
later concepts of law which contain an element of self-help
Self-help is the solution of a conflict without recourse to
legal proceedings. Unlike in situations of self-defense or
necessity in which there is not sufficient time to get
protection by the courts, self-help denotes situations in
which there is no emergency, but the actors do not try to
recur to legal proceedings, either because an authority to
supervise the process does not yet exist or for other
reasons
.
a) Philosophical Background:
It is disputed whether there ever was a time in which no
legal authority existed. Some assume that, originally,
conflicts were dealt with by violence of all individuals
against each other and that later the state gradually took
over the monopoly of exercising force. This reminds of
notions of the 18th and 19th century of a social contract.
Others claim that rules necessarily developed as soon as
individuals gathered in social groups.
The proponents of the first category argue that in
early Rome the gentes revenged harm done to one of their
7members and thus solved conflicts by self-help. 10 According
to them, the state later took over that authority and did
not allow the exercise of force unless the courts had
recognized by a formal rite 11 that the party exercising
force had a right to do so. They emphasize elements in the
legal proceedings of a later time which they view as remains
of self-help such as the fact that the execution of judg-
ments was done by the plaintiff until at least the 2nd
century B . C . 1-2
The proponents of the other theory argue that legal
rules existed from the moment in which social groups
emerged. 13 Such rules first regulated conflicts within the
group and later were transferred to conflicts between the
gentes. 14 According to this theory, the groups abided by
those rules because they were convinced that a divine power
had imposed them. 15 The outcome of a conflict was not
regarded as a settlement because it reflected the current
10 Wolfgang Kunkel, Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung des roemischen Kriminalverfahrens
in vorsullanischer Zeit 42 (1962) ; Giuseppe Luzzatto, Von der Selbsthilfe
zum roemischen Prozess, 73 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fuer
Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung (SZ) 29, 32, 38-39 (1956); Herbert
Hausmaninger & Walter Selb, Roemisches Privatrecht 331 (3d ed. 1985) ; Dietrich
V. Simon, Begriff und Tatbestand der Iniuria, 82 SZ 132, 145-46 and 159
(1965) .
11 Luzzatto, supra note 10, at 50.
12 Kunkel, supra note 10, at 131-33; Simon, supra note 10, at 145-46 and
159; that both is a remnant of self-help is admitted even by one of the
opponents of this theory: Max Kaser, Praetor und iudex im roemischen
Zivilprozess, 32 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis (TR) 329, 361 (1964)
[hereinafter Kaser TR]
.
13 Max Kaser, Das Roemische Privatrecht, Erster Abschnitt (vol. I), § 4 II,
at 21 (1955) [hereinafter Kaser RP] ; Max Kaser, Das Roemische
Zivilprozessrecht, § 3 III, at 21-22 (1966) [hereinafter Kaser ZP] ; Kaser
TR, supra note 12, at 337-40.
14 Gerardo Broggini, Vindex und Iudex, 76 SZ 113, 130-31 (1959).
15 Id. at 132; see Kaser TR, supra note 12, at 336-37.
balance of power between the parties but because the contest
of the parties was decided by a kind of ordeal. 16 They view
the ordeal and the oracle as the earliest way of finding law
and claim that more rational ways of finding law were
invented only later. 17 Therefore, the oath in the legis
actio sacramento is, according to them, a remainder of the
earliest roots of law-making and not an anomaly. Apart from
other, more convincing explanations of the role of the oath
in legal proceedings, 18 I doubt that "the fact that the
authority is not embodied in a person" or a court "does not
mean that there is no authority ." 1!^ why should the stronger
party abide by the law if there is no authority that will
immediately answer misconduct by a sanction? Can we assume
from our own experiences with mankind that the divine law
will always be followed?
Even Kaser - inconsistently with his own theory -
mentions that a king who imposed a death penalty upon a
citizen would have had to fear the revenge of the gens of
the convict. 20 So the dispute seems to boil down to the
question whether blood-revenge was the rule or the excep-
tion, and does not need to be dealt with in detail. 21
16 Broggini, supra note 14, at 131-32; for further discussion see Kaser
RP and Kaser ZP, supra note 13.
17 Kaser TR, supra note 12, at 337-38.
As a means to achieve a desired result by way of a "dodge" when the
existing system allows no other way to achieve it. Alan Watson: Curses,
Oaths, Ordeals, and Trials of Animals, unpublished.
19 Broggini, supra note 14, at 132.
20 Kaser TR, supra note 12, 339-40.
21 For a further discussion see Kaser ZP, supra note 13, § 3 II 3, at
19-21.
b) Remedy for the Killing of a Person:
Traces of an old concept of self-help seem to have remained
in the remedy for the killing of a person. Two rules have
been passed down to us from the time of the roman kings:
"Qui hominem liberum dolo sciens morti duit, parricidas
esto" 22 and "si telum manu fugit magis quam iecit, aries
subici tur
.
" 23 According to Kunkel , the meaning of
"parricidas" is not restricted to the murderer of a relative
but means every murderer. 24 Kunkel views the parricidas
clause as a provision restricting the application of the
remedy for murder to intentional murder, whereas in the case
of accidental murder a ram had to be surrendered to the
agnates25 of the deceased. In the parricidas clause, it was
not necessary to mention the remedy because it was known to
everybody. As to this remedy, Kunkel draws conclusions from
the remedy for accidental killing: The "si telum" clause
provides that the ram shall "subicitur," "be given as a
22 Sexti Pompei Festi de Verborum Significatu quae supersunt cum Pauli
Epitome (Wallace M. Lindsay ed., 1913) (hereinafter: Festus//page of
Lindsay-edition//keyword ), Festus 221 (parricida) , translation: The one
who intentionally kills a freeman, shall be a murderer.
23 XII T. 8,24a, in: Fontes Iuris Romani Anteiustiniani (S. Riccobono et al .
eds
.
, 1968), translation: "If a weapon sped accidentally from one's
hand, rather than if one has aimed and hurled it, to atone for the deed
a ram is substituted as a peace offering to prevent blood-revenge ." (this
is a quite free translation in: Ancient Roman Statutes (Allan C. Johnson
ed. and transl
.
, 1961) . As to the date of origin see Kunkel, supra note
10, at 39 & n.137. Similarly Servius, In Vergilii Eclogas, 4,43 in Fontes
Iuris Romani Anteiustiniani, supra, at 13-14: "In Numae legibus cautum est,
ut, si quis imprudens ocidisset hominem, pro capite occisi agnatis eius
in contione (in the original: cautione) offerret arietem.
24 Kunkel, supra note 10, at 39-40 (because one can not assume that the
quaestores parricidii which are mentioned in the Twelve Tables were
merely in charge of convicting murders of relatives)
.
25 Male blood relations on the father's side.
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substitute." This is confirmed by Festus; 26 "[I]n eodem
libro Antistius ait dare arietem, qui pro se agatur
,
caedatur.
"
The ram was a substitute for the tortfeasor himself.
The blood-revenge was done to the ram instead of the
tortfeasor
.
27
Others tried to explain the ram as a kind of wergild,
as a compensation for the death of the deceased like that
one known to the ancient Germans. 2 ^ But the flaw of this
explanation is that the value of the ram would have been
insufficient as a compensation. 2 ^
Likewise, it can not be regarded as a sacrifice to
reconcile the gods, who were offended by the murder. 3 Such
a sacrifice would have been sacrificed directly to the gods
by the tortfeasor instead of been surrendered to the
agnates
.
31
Festus, 476 (subigere arietem)
27 Kunkel, supra note 10, at 41; id. at 129: even an obligation of the
heir to take revenge, otherwise not allowed to inherit: D. 2 9, 5,9;
Wittmann, Die Koerperverletzung An Freien im klassischen roemischen Recht, at 2
(1972) .
O ft Alfred Heuss, Zur Entwicklung des Imperiums der roemischen Oberbeam-
ten, 64 ZS 57, 98 (1944) ; more information about wergild: Ernst Mayer,
Germanische Wergelder sowie Weiderechte und roemische Multa, 8 TR 1
.
29 Kunkel, supra note 10, at 41.
Cincius, cited by Festus, 470 (subici aries) ; Max Kaser, Altroemisches
Ius 50 (1949); E. Wieacker, Zwoelftafelprobleme, Rev. Int. des Droits de
l'Antiquite, 3. Ser., 3 (1956) 459, 480-81; see also Genesis 22:13
(vicarious sacrifice)
.
31 Kunkel, supra note 10, at 41; Wittmann, supra note 27, at 20.
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c) Manifest Theft at Night. XII T. 8. 12/13:
A thief who commits a theft by night may be killed by the
owner if the thief defends himself by a weapon and after the
owner has shouted and summoned the neighbors. 32 But a thief
who commits theft by night may be killed lawfully by the
owner in any case, 33 that is, even if there is no self-
defense situation. The mere fact that the theft occurs by
night - and therefore is regarded as more dangerous - is
sufficient. The owner is allowed to enforce the law without
recourse to legal proceedings. 34 This evidences that a
means of self-help actually was in use.
One might object that this was a provision without
practical relevance. We have no evidence that it ever
happened. It might be comparable to sentences for multiple
life- imprisonment in contemporary U.S. law.
32 XII T. 8,13; "Luci... si telo defendit... endoque plorato."; Cicero,
M. Tulli Ciceronis pro M. Tullio oratio, in: M. Tulli Ciceronis orationes
(Oxonii e typographeo Clarendoniano ed
.
, reprinted 1956) vol. 6
(hereinafter Cic. pro Tullio) 20,47 : "Atque ille legem mini se XII tab.
recitavit
,
quae permit tit, ut furem noctu liceat occidere et luce, si se
telo defendat." Cic. pro Tullio 21,50 : " Furem... luce occidi vetant
XII tab. .. nisi se telo defendit, inquit; etiamsi cum telo venerit,
nisi utetur telo eo ac repugnabit , non occides ; quod si repugnat,
' endoplorato
'
, hoc est, conclamato, ut aliqui audiant et conveniant .
"
(emphasis added) .
33 XII T. 8,12: " Si nox furtum faxsit, si im occisit , iure caesus
esto." Gaius D. 9.2.4.1: "Lex duodecim tabularum furem noctu deprehensum
occidere permittit ( ut tamen id ipsum cum clamore testificetur)
:
interdiu autem deprehensum ita permittit occidere , si is se telo
defendat , ut tamen aeque cum clamore testificetur
.
"
34 only an addictio by the praetor was required: Aulus Gellius, Noctes
Atticae ( P.K. Marshall ed., 1968) (hereinafter Gell.) 11,18,8; Gaius,
Institutiones (E.A. Whittuck ed . , Edward Poste transl . , 1991) (hereinafter
G. Inst.) G. Inst. 3.189.
12
On the other hand, the putting to death of a thief is
repeatedly mentioned by Roman authors which makes it more
likely that it actually was in practice.
Cicero : " [U] t furem noctu liceat occidere . . ."35
Gaius: "Lex duodecim tabularum furem noctu deprehensum
occidere permit tit . . . ."36
Ulpian: " Proinde si furem nocturnum, quern lex duodecim
tabularum omnimodo permittit occidere . . . ."37
Gellius: "XXI tabulis scripserunt .... Nam furem, qui
manifesto furto prensus esset, turn demum occidi permiserunt
,
si aut , cum faceret fur turn, nox esset, aut interdiu se, cum
prenderetur, defenderet .
"
3 8
There also is another text which just mentions that the
fur manifestus was assigned to the creditor. It is question-
able if this disproves the theory that the thief was killed.
"Poena manifesti furti ex lege XII tabularum capitalis
erat. Nam liber verberatus addicebatur ei qui fur turn
fecerat . Utrum autem servus efficeretur ex addictione , an
adiudicati loco constitueretur , veteres quaerebant ....
Sed postea inprobata est asperitas poenae et tarn ex servi
35 Cic. pro Tullio, supra note 32.
36 Gai. D. 9.2.4.1 supra note 33 "The law of the XII Tables permits one
to kill a thief caught in the night ..."
3 7 In: Collatio Legum Romanarum ET Mosaicarum (Moses Hyamson ed. and
transl., 1913) (hereinafter Collatio) 7,3,2 and 3: translation: "If
then, a thief coming by night has been killed, as is allowed by the law
of the Twelve Tables in all circumstances . . . .
"
38 Gellius 11,18,7.
13
persona quam ex liberi quadrupli actio praetoris edicto
cons ti tuta est." 39
At the first glance it seems to prove that there was only
slavery or debt - servitude . But it talks only about furtum
manifestum in general. But there is also a further Gellius-
passage : "Nisi duram esse legem putas , quae . . . furem
manifestum ei , cui furtum factum est, in servitutem tradit,
nocturnum autem furem ius occidendi tribuit." 40 The
manifest thief is given into slavery but the one at night is
permitted to be killed. When talking about the "fur
manifestus" Gellius apparently means the ordinary thief by
day and does not include the thief caught by night whom one
could consider as "manifest" as well. 41 This makes it more
likely that the Gaius-passage above either deals with the
ordinary theft during the day and the thief caught by
quaestio lance et licio, 4 ^ especially because otherwise the
two Gaius-f ragments above would be inconsistent with each
other
.
39
G. Inst. 3.18 9: "The punishment provided by the law of the Twelve
Tables for manifest theft was capital; a freeman was first scourged and
then assigned, by judgment of the magistrate, to the person from whom he
had stolen (whether made his slave by the assignment or reduced to the
condition of an insolvent judgment debtor, was a subject of controversy
among the republican lawyers) .... But later ages disapproved of the
severity of the punishment, and theft, whether by a slave or by a
freeman, was punished by the praetorian edict with fourfold damages."
40 Gell. 20,1,7.
41 Similarly Alan Watson, The law of Obligations 231-33 (1965) [hereinafter
Watson, Obligations] ; Alan Watson, The law of Ancient Rome 76 (1970)
[hereinafter Watson, Ancient Rome] ; Alan Watson, Roman Private Law Around 200
B.C. at 150 & n.7 (1971) [hereinafter Watson, 200 B.C.]
.
42 XII T. 8,15b; G. Inst. 3.192; as to a thief caught by quaestio lance
et licio see David Daube, Some Comparative Law: Furtum Conceptum, 15 TR
48, 68-71 and 74.
14
Besides, unlike executing multiple life sentences, it
is feasible to kill a tortfeasor.
It is therefore more likely that the death penalty
actually was practical, at least in ancient times. The
later, more lenient line will be discussed infra, in chapter
F, a) .
d) Execution of Judgments in the Legisaction Procedure:
Besides, the fact that even in cases in which a judgment was
necessary the execution of the judgment was done by the
plaintiff supports the theory that at some earlier point of
time self-help was a common means of solving conflicts. The
state apparently took over the monopoly of exercising force
only gradually, first requiring legal proceedings before the
self-help could be executed and later, with the emerging of
the iucicia publica,^^ taking over the monopoly completely.
aa) Provisions about the execution regarding the payment of
an amount of money, XII T. 3,1-6:
While with actions in rem the creditor could take hold of
the object informally, 44 with the actions in personam the
debtor had a deadline of thirty days to settle the matter by
payment or by composition. 45 When the deadline had expired
the creditor was to be led into court for the legis actio
per manus iniectionem, in which the creditor lays his hand
43 Kunkel, supra note 10, at 96-97 and 134.
44 Kaser ZP, supra note 13, § 20 I, at 94
.
45 XII T. 3,1.
15
on some part of the debtor's body and speaks the formula:
"Quod tu mihi i [u] dicatus ( sive "damnatus" ) es sestertium
decern milia, quandoc non solvisti , ob earn rem ego tibi
sestertium decern milium iudicati manum inicio. " 46 When the
praetor had checked that all prerequisites had been met and
if the debtor did not satisfy the judgment or somebody acted
as a vindex to help him47 the praetor gave the creditor the
addictio^^ and the creditor led the debtor away. Within a
60
-day period, the debtor was held in bonds by the creditor
and the amount for which he could be redeemed was made
public. 49 If the debtor was not redeemed and the parties
did not make a settlement he was put to death or sold into
slavery across the Tiber River. 50
But this can not serve as an example for punitive
elements in Roman Tort Law. Since the Twelve Tables provided
for this kind of execution not only for delictual but also
for contractual claims it can not be regarded as a punish-
ment for the initial wrongdoing . 51
Besides, the execution of judgments takes place on a
secondary stage. Punitive elements have to be looked for in
the initial remedy, not in the execution threatened if the
46 G. Inst. 4.21.
47 XII T. 3,3.
48 Only Gell. 20,1,44 reports that an addictio had to be given.
49 XII T. 3,3-5. The Twelve Tables even specify the weight of the
fetters and the food which the debtor could claim.
50 XII T. 3,5.
It is disputed whether it was a punishment for the failure to pay.
It seems to have been rather a means to make the debtor pay, though
Gellius 20,1,47-48 speaks of "capitis poena", see Kaser ZP, supra note
13, § 20 I, at 94, and for a further discussion see references in Kaser
RP, supra note 13, § 39, at 128-131.
16
debtor does not comply with the judgment. It is relevant
only because it contains traces of self-help reflecting an
earlier stage of development.
Since we do not have any evidence that the debtor was
put to death or sold into slavery, it is possible that it
did not occur. 52 But we have evidence 53 that debtors had
to work off the sum as private prisoners, debt-serfs, of the
creditor
.
54
The relevant aspect is that XII T. 3, 1-6 are evidence
that the execution of judgments was done by the creditor
privately. The fact that force was exercised by the creditor
and not by the state intimates that originally it was for
the party which was wronged to obtain justice by themselves.
Besides, in that context, it is interesting that with
the legis actions in personam the creditor was allowed to
take hold of the debtor physically, not only of his assets.
It was not until the introduction of the formulary procedure
that an execution into the assets 55 was possible as an
alternative to the personal execution. 56 Traces of
52 See Alan Watson, Rome Of The XII Tables 123 (1975) ; Kaser ZP, supra
note 13, § 20 VIII 1, at 102.
53 Titus Livius, Ab Urbe Condita Libri (W. Weissenborn et al . eds . , 1963)
(hereinafter Liv.) 2,23,6; 2,35,1; 6,14,3/4/10; 6,15,9; 6,20,5/6;
6,27,6-8; Dionysius of Halicarnassus
,
Antiquitates Romanae (Carolus Jacobi ed.,
1885) 6,26; 6,29; 6,58-59; 6,82; 16,5.
54 Though the death penalty might reflect a practice of a period of
time prior to the written evidence handed down to us, and Livy and
Dionysius might refer to a practice which later came to be used.
into all the assets by way of bankruptcy proceedings.
56 Kaser ZP, supra note 13, § 20 VIII 2, at 104 & n. 87; Kaser RP,
supra note 13, § 56 I, IV, at 296-97 and 300.
17
self-help are more obvious in the physical seizure of the
creditor than in the execution into the assets.
bb) execution of judgments in general:
XII T. 3, 3 and 5 presuppose an adjudged amount of money.
But the Twelve Tables also provide for different remedies
such as the death penalty for the tortfeasor57 or talio 58
for the execution of which the provisions of XII T. 3,1-6 do
not make sense. It can be assumed that no 3 day's grace was
given to the tortfeasors in these situations . 59
Who executed the remedy in those cases? Gaius^®
reports that the fur manifestus at once was turned over by
addictio^l to the one against whom the theft was committed
for being scourged and put to death. Again, the execution
was done by the person who originally was wronged.
Kunkel proposes that in the time of the Twelve Tables there
was not yet a distinction between criminal law and private
(tort) law62 and that the remedy generally63 was executed
by the party which was wronged.
He therefore calls the type of proceedings "private
criminal proceedings" and views the role of the courts as
For the fur manifestus: Kaser ZP, supra note 13, § 20 IV, at 97.
57 XII T. 8, 24b; 8, 12/13 .
58 XII T. 8,2.
59
60 3, 189.
61 See also Gell . 11,18,8.
62 Supra note 10, at 130-31 (based upon a text by Livy) ; there were
genuine criminal proceedings only for treason and breach of official
duty, at 130; at 114: The first table of the Twelve Tables contains
provisions about procedural law without distinguishing between types of
proceedings
.
63 With few exceptions, see Kunkel, supra note 10, at 43.
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that of an institution which merely checks and confirms that
there is a situation justifying self-help by the plain-
tiff. 64 Kunkel regards it as likely that a system of
private revenge supervised by the courts was in use up to
the times of the second Punic War. According to Livy, after
the battle of Cannae (216 B.C.), the dictator M. Junius Pera
needed troops and promised the "pecuniae iudicati , " the
debt-serfs, to make their masters release them from the
debt-servitude if they would serve as soldiers in the
army. 65 Kunkel proposes that not until the iudicia publica,
a rough equivalent to contemporary criminal proceedings, 66
became more common during the 2nd century B.C. 67 the state
took over the task of executing judgments.
Similarly, others claim that the execution of judgments
was up to the end of the classical period a private action
by the plaintiff which was merely supervised by the
courts
.
68
64 Kunkel, supra note 10, at 132; see also Kunkel ' s theory that the
legis actio sacramento was used for criminal matters as well, id. at
102-103 and 106.
65 Kunkel, supra note 10, at 104-106 & n. 380; reference to Liv.
23,14,2-3. Besides, from a Cato-reference in Festus/ 466/ "sacramento" he
draws the conclusion that the XII table provisions were valid law up to
the first decade of the second century B.C.
.
66 See August F. v. Pauly, 4 Pauly's Realencyclopaedie der class ischen
Altertumswissenschaften (Georg Wissowa, ed., 1901) Crimen, column 1712-1728
and Delictum, column 2438-2439.
Kunkel, supra note 10, at 96-97 and 134, the introduction of
numerous permanent quaestiones was not possible before the lex Sempronia
iudicaria (by C. Gracchus, 122 B.C.) , which allowed the equites to
become judges, a function which previously was restricted to the then-
existing number of 300 senators.
68 Kaser ZP, supra note 13, § 1 IV 2 , at 8; Simon, supra note 10, at
159; similarly Leage ' s Roman Private Law 394 (A.M. Prichard ed . , 3rd ed.
1961)
.
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e) Summary: Evidence for blood-revenge:
From all these examples, the delivery of a ram to the
agnates, the right to kill the fur manifestus , and the role
of the plaintiff in the execution of judgments in the
legisaction system69 can serve as indirect evidence of an
earlier stage of self-help, the remains of which are
reflected in those provisions dating from a later time which
were discussed above.
D. Talio in the XII Tables;
Besides, there are two express provisions about talio in the
Twelve Tables. 70 Though talio is already a restriction when
compared to blood-revenge, it nevertheless is based upon the
principle of self-help.
a) As a Remedy for Physical Injury:
XII T.8,2 provides: "If anyone has broken another's limb71
there shall be retaliation in kind, unless he compounds for
compensation with him." 7 ^
69 the formal legal procedure named "actions of the law," "legis
actiones .
"
70 A third one could be XII T. 8,24b.
There are different views as to what membrum ruptuw means:
1. Severing of a limb
2. Same as "corrumpere" : to injure
3. Serious injuries which lead to permanent damage to the limb,
disability.
For a discussion see Wittmann, supra note 27, at 3-4.
72 in: Ancient Roman Statutes (Allan C. Johnson ed. and transl .
, 1961) .
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h) As a Remedy for Burning a Building:
XII T. 8,10 provides: "Whoever destroys by burning a
building or stack of grain placed besides a house ... shall be
bound, scourged and burned to death." {emphasis added) . 73
The harm is mirrored in the punishment.
Watson objects 74 that there was no evidence that talio
ever was in practice. He views the provision as a mere
threat to make the defendant more willing to compromise and
work off the amount
.
On the other hand, for a threat to be effective, it has
to be at least probable to the defendant that the threatened
sanction will actually be carried out. Besides, several
authors cite the Xll-table provision, treating it either as
valid law or as historically valid law:
Priscian: 7 ^ "Si quis membrum rupit aut os fregit, talione
proximus cognatus ulciscitur."
Gaius
:
7 ^ "Poena autem iniuriarum ex lege XII tab. propter
membrum quidem ruptum talio erat ." (emphasis added) (treating
it as historical law)
73 Translation see supra note 69; this is the remedy applicable to an
intentional act; as to the accidental burning of a building see the
continuing text of XII T. 8,10.
74 Supra note 52, at 12 3-24; Alan Watson, Personal Injuries in the XII
Tables, 43 TR 213, 219 (1975) (though admitting that the Gellius passage
20,1,38 which reports that the punishment was limited to a fine "is best
taken not to refer to the XII tables but to a subsequent age" at 219)
;
see also Simon, supra note 10, at 176-77 with reference to Gell .
16, 10, 18 .
75 Priscian, Institutio de arte Grammatica (Henricus Keil ed., 1961) vol. 2,
at 6, 13, 69.
76 G. Inst. 3.223.
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Cato: 77 "Si quis membrum rupit aut os fregit, talione
proximus cognatus ulciscitur. "
This makes it unlikely that the provision was not practical
and was a failure 78 by the decemviri.
Since the Twelve Tables also contain provisions about
payment of damages it is questionable whether one can draw
the conclusion that those remedies occurred in a sequence or
whether they could have been in use contemporaneously.
E. Provisions about Damages in the Twelve Tables:
"Manu fustive si os fregit libero, CCC , si servo, CL poenam
subit sestertiorum. "79
"Si iniuriam (alteri) faxsit, viginti quinque poenae
sun to. " 80
This creates the confusing picture that the maiming of
a limb at least potentially was punished by talio, whereas
the breaking of a bone was fined by 300 asses, and all other
injuries by only 25 asses though the breaking of a bone can
be equally serious as membrum rumpere in the sense of
" corrumpere^^- ."82 one explanation which might be given is
that the membrum ruptum clause is a remnant from a more
77 Cato, Origines IV, in: Caton, Les Origines (Martine Chassignet ed . and
transl
.
, 1986 ) = VI , 5 in the Jordan-edition.
78 Watson, supra note 52, at 124.
79 XII T. 8,3
80 XII T. 8,
4
81 See supra note 68.
82 for a discussion of these problems see Wittmann, supra note 27, at
4; Watson, supra note 73, at 213-22; Elemer Polay, Iniuria-Tatbestaende
im archaischen Zeitalter des antiken Row, 101 SZ 142, 153-55 and 160-62
(1984) .
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primitive stage of development which does not fit into the
system of remedies of later times. 83
But examples from other cultures show that severe and
less severe remedies take turns. 84 The Laws of Lipit-Istar,
king of Isin in the 19th century B.C., knew talionic
punishment. 85 Later, the Laws of Esnunna ( about 18th
century B.C.) punished bodily injuries to freemen by
imposing a fine. 8 ^ This fine recurs in the Code of
Hammurabi (in the 17th century B.C.) : One mina of silver for
putting out an eye 87 and 1/3 mina for knocking out a
tooth. 88 But the difference is that it applies only to the
injury of a member of a lower class of the population, to a
muskenum. Q ^ Injuries to freemen of a higher rank iawilum)
are punished by talio.
Similarly, where the Laws of Esnunna 42 impose a
penalty of ten shekels of silver for a slap into the face of
a freeman, the Code of Hammurabi § 2 04 provides for ten
shekels only if a muskenum slaps a muskenum. In all other
cases, if an awilum slaps his peer^O or if a muskenum slaps
83 See P.B.H. Birks, The Early History of Iniuria, 37 TR 163,179-81
(1969): ("the retention of talio"); id. at 208: ("the outdated
provisions for membrum rumpere and os frangere")
.
84 Reuven Yaron, Enquire now about Hammurabi, Ruler of Babylon, 59 TR
223-38 (1991)
.
85 Yaron, id. , at 230
.
86 Laws of Esnunna 42, see Yaron, supra note 83, at 230.
87 Code Of Hammurabi § 198, in: The Babylonian Laws 77 (Godfrey R. Driver et
al
.
eds. and transls., 1955, reprinted 1960) (hereinafter CH)
.
88 CH § 201.
89 See transcription in Driver-edition, supra note 86: " MAS . EN . KAK " =
"muskenum"
.
As to the meaning of the term muskenum see Yaron, supra note
83, at 228.
90 CH § 203.
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a higher-ranking person, an awilum, 91 there is a penalty of
one mina (sixty shekels) of silver, respectively sixty
stripes with a whip of ox-hide. Yaron points out that this
is, in case of § 203, the sixfold amount compared to the
Laws of Esnunna, and in the case of § 204, the punishment
could even cause the death of the tortfeasor. 92
A further example is the remedy for the concealment of
a fugitive slave, a delict which is comparable to theft. In
the Laws of Lipit-Istar 12, the tortfeasor had to furnish a
further slave 9 -^ while in the case of ordinary theft the
culprit was put to death. 94 According to the Laws of
Esnunna 49, the concealer of a fugitive slave had to furnish
a further slave. 9 ^ But Hammurabi in §§ 16 and 19 provided
for the death of the concealer.
There are even two strikingly similar provisions about
the theft of a boat and of a pig.
One is a text in Sumerian, FLP 1287
:
96
FLP iii 10-12: "If (a man) has stolen a boat, he shall
double (its value) as compensation.
13-15 If (a man) has stolen a pig, he shall
double (its value) as compensation."
The same situation shows up later in the Code of Hammurabi §
8: "If a man has stolen an ox or a sheep or an ass or a pig
91 ch § 202.
92 Yaron, supra note 83, at 230-31.
93 Yaron, supra note 83, at 230.
94 The Babylonian Laws, supra note 86, at 306
95 Yaron, supra note 83, at 229.
96 See Yaron, supra note 83, at 22 9.
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or a boat: . . . (ii) if (property) of a muskenum 97 he
shall replace tenfold, (iii) If the thief has not (the
amount) to be given, he shall be put to death." {emphasis
added)
Identical as the regulated situation is, the punishment is,
without doubt, much more severe.
But the ancient orient also knew more severe as well as
more lenient remedies. Provisions in the Hittite Code, which
is generally acknowledged to date from the 14th century
B.C. 98 deal with physical injuries and theft as well:
The knocking out of a tooth or the blinding of a freeman is
sanctioned by twenty half -shekels of silver. The provision
expressly mentions that the earlier remedy was payment of
one pound of silver."
For theft, there are flexible remedies: "If he steal
much, they shall impose on him much; if he steal little,
they shall impose on him little, . . ."100 ^s a guideline,
§ 94 gives twelve half -shekels of silver. On the other hand,
a thief of an oxen has to give fifteen oxen (formerly even
thirty)
.
101 Severe and less severe remedies are found even
within the same code
.
In the sense of "anybody," because muskenum is not opposed to awilum
here, see Yaron, supra note 83, at 230.
Q O See J.M. Powis Smith, The Origin and History of the Hebrew Law, appendix
IV, at 246 (Arnold Walther transl
.
, 1931) ; as to the date of origin, see
id. at 274.
99 § 7.
100 § 94
101 § 57.
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The Bible regulates the remedies for physical injuries
as well: If the injury does not have permanent consequences,
the tortfeasor merely has to compensate the injured for not
being able to work. If there is a permanent injury, Exodus
21:18-20 provide for talio.
These provisions show that the punishment by Hammurabi was
in many cases more serious than that of his predecessors,
though his code was composed within basically the same
cultural environment.-'-^ Later times followed partially a
more lenient and partially a more severe line. 11-^
The conclusion that can be drawn from that for the
Roman law is that the membrum ruptum clause in XII T. 8,2
does not necessarily have to be classified as a remnant from
a more primitive stage. Talio and damages, maybe even
various forms of self-help could have existed contemporane-
ously in Roman Law.
The problem of the alleged inconsistency in the system
of remedies of the Twelve Tables has to be solved otherwise.
Here is not the place to discuss this issue in detail. One
of the possible explanations is that membrum rumpere means
the severing of a limb (which does not necessarily cause
disability, for example in the case of knocking out a
tooth)
.
Thus, there would be special provisions for this and
for the breaking of a bone, whereas the iniuria-povision
102 See Yaron, supra note 83, at 229.
103 If the Hittite laws, drafted in an admittedly different culture,
may be taken as an example.
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would be applicable to all other physical injuries. 104 At
least in the ordinary course of matters, the severing of a
limb would be more serious than the breaking of a bone and
these two injuries would be more serious than those
regulated by the iniuria-provision
.
F. Later Development and the Lex Aquilia:
a) furtum manifestum:
The former death penalty for the manifest thief later was
replaced by payment of quadruple damages 105 when the
praetor created the actio furti manifest!
.
b) execution of judgments:
The lex Poetelia 10 ^ did not abolish the death penalty or
slavery for the insolvent debtor but only prohibited to put
people other than criminals into fetters. 107 It was
intended to mitigate the plight of debtors.
c) Talio for membrum ruptum :
Even in earlier times the tortfeasor apparently was given
some protection by the praetor who could refuse to give the
addictio for the execution of the talio if he thought that
104 Polay, supra note 81, at 160-62; for a thorough discussion see
references in note 79.
105 G. Inst. 3.189 - text see chapter C, c, translation see note 39;
Gell
. 11,18,10: " Sed nunc a lege ilia decemvirali discessum est. Nam si
qui super manifesto furto iure et ordine experiri velit, actio in
quadruplum datur" ; as to the date of origin of this provision see Kaser
ZP, supra note 13, § 20 II 3, at 96
.
106 Liv. 8,28,8.
107 Kaser ZP, supra note 13, § 20 VIII 2, at 103.
27
the plaintiff demanded an overly high amount. 108 Subse-
quently to the XII tables, the praetor introduced the
"edictum. . .de aestimandis iniuriis" 1 ®^ which allowed him to
estimate the penalty by himself and to render a judgment
about it
.
Therefore, the wronged party could only execute the talio if
the tortfeasor chose 110 this option (or had no money)
.
d) Examples of Damages in the Lex Aquilia - Punitive
Elements in the Calculation of Damages:
The First Chapter of the lex Aquilia provides:
"C7t qui 1 ^- 1 servum servamque alienum alienamve quadrupedem
v
-ej_112 pecudem iniuria occiderit
,
quanti id in eo anno
plurimi fuerit, tantum aes dare domino damnas esto." 11 ^
Third Chapter according to D. 9.2.27.5:
"Ceterarum rerum, praeter hominem et pecudem occisos
,
114 si
108 see Gell. 20,1,36-38; Wittmann, supra note 27, at 5-6 & n.18.
109 Gell. 20,1,37/38.
110 Gell. 20,1,36.
111 Other version: "si quis"
.
112 Other version: "quadrupedewve
.
"
113 D. 9.2.2 in The Digest of Justinian (Latin text: Theodor Mommsen ed.,
translation: Alan Watson ed
.
, 1985) [hereinafter Watson-Digest] : "If
anyone kills unlawfully a slave or servant-girl belonging to someone
else or a four-footed beast of the class of cattle, let him be condemned
to pay the owner the highest value that the property had attained in the
preceding year .
"
n ~\ a. This first part is interpolated: Ulrich v. Luebtow, Untersuchungen zur lex
Aquilia de damno iniuria dato at 21 & n.6, (1970) ; David Daube , On The Third
Chapter of the Lex Aquilia, 52 Law Q. Rev. 253, 261 n.26 (1936) ; O.
Lenel, Review of H.F. Jolowicz, 43 ZS 575, 575 (1922); F.H. Lawson & B.S.
Markesinis, Tortious liablity for Unintentional Harm in the Common Law and the Civil
Law 5-6 (1982) .
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quis alteri damnum faxit, quod usserit fregerit ruperit
iniuria, quanti ea res erit115 in diebus triginta proximis,
tantum aes domino dare damnas esto." 116
As to the first chapter, it is obvious that the highest
value within the preceding year is not necessarily but can
be punitive. The baseline is the compensation for the actual
harm which the plaintiff suffered, but if the chattel had a
higher value within the given period of time he could
recover more than that in which case the calculation
damages would contain a punitive element. 117
It has been subject to much dispute what the original
wording of the third chapter was and whether the remedy was
punitive. One view is that originally it read " fuerit" and
provided that the tortfeasor had to compensate the owner for
value which the chattel ires) had in the thirty days
preceding the damaging. 118 Luebtow explains the difference
to chapter one as to the relevant period of time by the fact
that a greater extent of punishment was appropriate for
killing because it was a greater wrong than the
damaging
.
119
115 Other version: "fuerit;" see Herbert Haosmaningei Das :: : ICHI
der lex Ac ' at 7 n.6 (1987) .
116 Translation in Watson-Digest, supra note 112: "In the case of all
other things apart from slaves or cattle that have been killed, if
anyone does damage to another by wrongfully burning, b] Lng m
spoiling his property, let him be condemned to paj I o the owne:
the damage shall prove to be worth in the next thirty days
117 G. Inst. 3.214.
Luebtow, supra note 113, at 12 22
119 Luebtow, supra note 113, at 120
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It is not disputed that the compensation was not
confined to the mere market value but that certain disadvan-
tages were taken into account {causae corpori
cohaerentes120 ). There are several passages proving this,
for example Neraz 121 held that if a slave was designated as
heir but killed before he could enter upon the inheritance,
the owner could recover not only the market value of the
slave but also the value of the inheritance. 122 Ulpian123
gives a situation in which a slave working as accountant
fraudulently tampered with the records and subsequently was
killed. The owner could recover for his interest in
detecting the fraud as well as for the market value of the
slave
.
12 ^
But there is considerable controversy if the highest
market value was the basis of the calculation and the
inclusion of other disadvantages an exception or if the
owner originally was compensated for all the difference in
his assets resulting from the injury to his property.
If one agrees with Luebtow that " fuerit" was the
original wording one has to assume that the " quant i ea res
fuerit" referred to the market value of the property since
120 Paul. D. 9.2.22.1.
121 in Ulpian D. 9.2.23.pr..
122 See also G. Inst. 3.212.
D. 9.2.23.4: " [Q] uanti mea interest fraudes servi per earn commissas
detegi
.
"
124 But those fragments concern the first chapter and one can not
necessarily draw conclusions for the third one.
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previous to the injury there is not yet a difference in the
assets which could be regarded. 125
On the other hand, Daube suggested that "erit" was the
original wording and that it made sense to give the owner
the value which the matter (res) would have within thirty
days after the infliction of the injury because the lex
Aquilia originally dealt only with slaves and animals and
not with inanimate property. 126 When animals or humans are
wounded, it usually turns out only after some time if the
injury will be permanent and how much the medical expenses
and all other consequential costs will be. The meaning of
the provision would have been that the owner would have been
compensated for all the difference in his assets which the
event caused and which became apparent within thirty days
(i.e. for the interesse) . This would be merely compensatory,
not punitive
.
According to Daube, the scope of the provision was
widened in the second half of the first century B.C. to
comprise inanimate property as well. 127 Due to this change
of interpretation, it made sense to change the wording to
"fuerit" because one did not need to wait and see how the
damage developed in the next thirty days if inanimate
property was affected. This meant a change form the calcula-
tion of interesse to the calculation of market value. If
Daube is right, the first chapter would have been
125 Luebtow, supra note 113, at 121.
126 Daube, supra note 113, at 256.
127 Daube, supra note 113, at 259-261
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(potentially) punitive while the third chapter would
originally have been compensatory with a subsequent change
to a punitive element, to the highest value within the
preceding thirty days.
Luebtow's basic argument for the authenticity of
"fuerit" and the market value calculation has been mentioned
above. But his opponents seem to have more convincing ones.
The mentioning of both frangere and rumpere makes sense only
in relation to animate property. ^28
Besides, it is remarkable that the third chapter does
not contain a "plurimi" as the first chapter did. This has
already been noticed by the ancient jurists: Ulpian^29 anc^
Gaius 130 suggest that the " quant i ea res erit (/fuerit)
"
should nevertheless be regarded as referring to the highest
value within the thirty-day period. Had the original wording
of the third chapter indeed been "fuerit" there would have
been no reason why the drafters should not have included the
"plurimi" as in the first chapter. The missing of this word
can be explained by assuming that the original wording was
"erit" in which case a "plurimi" would not have been
necessary and would not even have made sense. 13 1 j^; was not
until the inclusion of inanimate property, until the change
from "erit" to "fuerit" and the change from the interesse-
Daube, supra note 113, at 255.128
129 D. 9.2.29.8.
130 3,218.
131 Daube, supra note 113, at 262-63; Hausmamnger , supra note 114, at
7 and 29; Watson, Obligations, supra note 41, at 234-35; see also
Lawson, supra note 113, at 8.
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calculation to the calculation of value that this problem
emerged . 13 2
A further argument for the interesse-calculation is
that otherwise the tortfeasor would have had to pay the
whole value of the property even if it was only slightly
damaged. 133
Finally, Daube ' s suggestion is consistent with the
Digest ' s passages mentioned above and the other texts we
have. As to the two above-mentioned Ulpian-f ragments , it is
plausible that the interesse-principle could have influenced
the interpretation of the first chapter. 134 It could even
be possible that it continued to be relevant for the third
chapter in cases of mere damaging after the change to the
value-calculation had taken place. 13 5
The fragments Gaius 3,218 and Ulpian D. 9.2.29.8
probably reflect the time after the change from "erit" to
"fuerit"
.
Besides, two doublet fragments adduced by Luebtow as
support for his theory that the interesse-calculation was
not introduced before Justinian's compilers interpolated the
texts 136 are well consistent with Daube ' s theory that there
was a later swing back to the interesse-calculation.
132 Daube, supra note 113, at 263-64; Hausmamnger, supra note 114, at
29-30
.
133 Daube, supra note 113, at 264.
134 Daube, supra note 113, at 264.
135 Daube, supra note 113, at 264; this is supported by Paul. D.
9.2.29.8, dealing with a situation covered by the third chapter and
talking about an estimation of the wound of the slave, not about the
slave ' s value
.
136 Luebtow, supra note 113, 127-29.
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Luebtow compares Ulpian in Collatio 2,4,1 and in D.
9.2.27.17, dealing with a situation in which the injury of a
slave did not cause a decline of his value. The only-
disadvantage to the owner consists in the medical expenses.
The question is whether he can get compensation for them. In
the Collatio-fragment medical expenses are recoverable only
as an annex to a recovery of the decline of the value,
therefore the owner could not make a case based on the lex
Aquilia. This reflects the state after the change to the
value-calculation. In the Digest-fragment , there are some
additions explaining the character of the actio legis
Aquiliae and answering the questions about the medical
expenses in the affirmative. This shows that Justinian's
compilers again brought about a change towards an interesse-
calculation in the third chapter. 1 -^ 7
While the first chapter's remedy was based upon the
potentially punitive value-calculation and only later was
complemented by interesse notions the third chapter
underwent a change from the merely compensatory interesse-
calculation to a value-calculation and, in Justinian's
times, a swing back to the interesse-calculation.
137 See Luebtow, supra note 113, at 129 and 131
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e) Other Punitive Elements in the hex Aquilia:
aa) Attachment of liability to the person:
Though the action survived if the wronged party died 138
there was no survival of action when the tortfeasor
died. 139 The damages were regarded as punishment and the
dead can not be punished any more.
bb) noxal liability:
But the punitive character of the Lex Aquilia becomes most
obvious in situations in which the tort is committed by the
son140 or the slave of a paterfamilias . Generally, the
paterfamilias is vicariously liable unless he surrenders the
wrongdoer to the wronged party {noxae deditio) . 141 But
usually he can free himself of the liability by the noxal
surrender even when he was aware of the delict. 14 ^
138 Ulp . D. 9.2.23.8: "Hanc actionem et heredi ceterisque successoribus
dari constat : sed in heredem vel ceteros haec actio non dabitur , cum sit
poenalis , nisi forte ex damno locupletior heres factus sit." "in
heredem" = against the heir.
139 G. Inst. 4.112: "Non omnes actiones . . . etiam in heredem aeque
conpetunt aut dari solent. Est enim certissima iuris regula , ex
maleficiis poenales actiones in heredem nee conpetere , nee dan solere,
veluti furti . . . ." See also Ulpian, supra note 137.
140 See Gerhard Beseler, Romanistische Studien, 46 ZS 83, 108 (1926);
contra: Watson, Obligations, supra note 41, at 211 -IB {the son is never
explicitly mentioned in the texts)
141 G. Inst. 4.76: "Constitutae sunt autem noxales actiones . . .
legibus, velut furti lege XII tabularum, damni miuria lege Aquilia; . .
.
." see Watson, Obligations, supra note 41, at 274; Luebtow, supra note
113, at 41; Cels. in Ulp. D. 9.4.2.1: "Celsus, however, draws a
distinction between the lex Aquilia and the Law of the Twelve Tables;
for under the old law, he says, if a slave committed theft or some other
damage with his master's knowledge there is a noxal action on the
slave's account and the master is not liable in his own name. But under
the lex Aquilia, he says, the master is liable on his own account, not
that of the slave." (translation in Watson-Digest, supra note 112).
142 Cels. in Ulp. D. 9.4.2.1 supra note 140; see Watson, Obligations,
supra note 41, at 278.
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But the Lex Aquilia contained special provisions about
the noxal liability of the paterfamilias . The noxal
surrender was not possible if the paterfamilias ordered the
tortfeasor to act or knew of the tort being committed and
was able to prevent it from being committed. 143
cc) Multiple Recovery when Several Tortfeasors:
If several people beat a slave and it is unclear which of
them hit the fatal blow, not only are all of them liable but
the owner can recover the full amount from each of them. 144
Ulpian explains this by the penal nature of the actio legis
Aquiliae. 145
dd) Cumulation of Actions Resting on Different Theories of
Recovery:
If several actions can be cumulated so that the plaintiff
can collect multiple damages or other benefits from the
143 Ulp . D. 9.4.2.pr. and 9.2.44.1: " Whenever a slave does a wounding
or killing with his master's knowledge, the master is without doubt
liable to the aquilian action." (translation in Watson-Digest, supra
note 112); Paul. D. 9.2.45.pr. ; Cels . in Ulp. D. 9.4.2.1.
144 Ulp. D. 9.2.11.2: " Sed si plures servum percusserint , utrum omnes
quasi occiderint teneantur, videamus . Et si quidem apparet cuius ictu
perierit, ille quasi occiderit tenetur : quod si non apparet, omnes quasi
occiderint teneri Iulianus ait, et si cum uno agatur , ceteri non
liberantur: nam ex lege Aquiliae quod alius praestitit , alium non
relevat, cum sit poena." "But if several people do a slave to death, let
us see whether they are all liable as for killing. If it is clear from
whose blow he perished, that person is liable for killing; but if it is
not clear, Julian says that the assailants are liable as if they had all
killed; and if the action is brought against only one of them, the
others are not released from liability; for under the lex Aquilia what
one pays does not lessen what is due from another, as it is a penal
law." See also Julian D. 9.2.15.1 ; Paul. D. 47.2.21.9.; see
Hausmaninger , supra note 114, at 17; Luebtow, supra note 113, at 57-59.
145 Ulp. D. 9.2.11.2; similarly Ulp. D. 9.2.11.4; Julian D. 9.2.51.2.
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defendant, the advantages accruing to him from the lawsuit
exceed the harm suffered and the remedy is therefore
punitive
.
There are three possibilities: Either there is a
genuine cumulation in a way that the plaintiff can collect
from both claims. Or he can sue resting on both judgment but
the amount from the first judgment is offset from the second
one so that the plaintiff can only claim the difference in
the second lawsuit . Or both claims can only exist alterna-
tively.
There was controversy among the ancient jurists as to
the possibility of a cumulation of delictual actions with
the actio legis Aquiliae . Some assumed that the actio
iniuriarum could be cumulated with the actio legis Aquiliae
,
for example, if a slave was intentionally injured. 14 ^
Paulus, on the other hand, offset the first judgment from
the second one and even mentioned other jurists who granted
the two actions only alternatively. 147
Some seem to have allowed a genuine cumulation of the
actio furti and the actio legis Aquiliae if a document was
stolen and defaced. 148 Paulus denied this if the destroying
did not happen right after the theft but later. 149
146 Labeo in Ulp
.
D. 47.10.15.46; Papiman D. 48.5.6.pr. ; Ulp . D.
9.2. 51.
147 D. 44 . 7 . 34 .pr .
.
148 Ulp. D. 47.2.27.3.
149 D. 47.2.28.
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Actions based upon the first and the third chapter
could be cumulated. 150 But Julian gave the second action
only if the plaintiff waived the right to obtain satisfac-
tion from the first judgment. 151 Since it was disputed
among the ancient jurists to what extent a cumulation with
delictual actions was possible no clear statement can be
made about how the punitive character of the lex Aquilia was
reflected in the cumulation with (delictual) actions.
But the cumulation with contractual actions is more
difficult, the rule is that purely penal actions can be
cumulated with purely reipersecutory ones 152 and there is
controversy as to whether the actio legis Aquiliae was
purely penal or mixed (penal as well as reipersecutory)
.
Gaius 153 regards the actio legis Aquiliae as a mixed
one. This is being followed by the majority of
authorities 154 but a minority of scholars views the actio
legis Aquiliae as a purely penal action. 155
150 Gai. D. 9.2.32.1; Ulp . D. 9.2.46.
151 D. 9.2.47.
1 ^ 2 Hausmaninger, supra note 114, at 37.
53 4,6-9: § 6: "We sue sometimes only to obtain property, sometimes
only for a penalty, sometimes both for property and for a penalty. § 7:
. . . . § 8 : "We sue, for instance, only for a penalty in the action of
theft . . . ; for we may obtain restitution on account of the thing
itself either by vindicatio or condictio. § 9 : We sue, for instance,
both for property and for a penalty in those actions where a defendant
who denies his liability is condemned to pay double, as in the actions .
. . to recover damages for injury to property under the lex Aquilia, and
. . .
." (translation by Poste supra note 34) ; on the other hand,
Ulpian mentions in different context that the action was penal : supra
note 143
.
See e.g. Luebtow, supra note 113, at 36 with further references.
155 E.g. Gerhard Beseler, Romanistische Studien , 47 ZS 53, 65
(1927) (Gaius 4,9 is interpolated).
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But there are many passages in the Digest which give
the actio legis Aquiliae only alternatively to the contrac-
tual action, 156 give an action only if the plaintiff waives
the other claim157 or have the first judgment offset from
the second one. 158 Unless one chooses to regard Gaius 4,6-9
and all the Digest -fragments as interpolated, 159 one has to
assume that the actio legis Aquiliae was a mixed one and a
genuine cumulation with contractual actions was not
possible
.
16 °
G. Development up to Justinian;
a) Physical injuries to Freemen and the Lex Aquilia:
It is disputed whether the Lex Aquilia was applicable to the
injury afflicted to freemen. 161 If this was so, this might
have been a more lenient punishment in most cases
.
The lex Aquilia deals only with damage to property and
its wording therefore is not applicable to freemen. But
since there are two fragments in the Digest, one by
Ulpian 16 ^ and one an Ulpian-f ragment citing Julian 16 ^
giving an action based upon the lex Aquilia in a situation
in which a shoemaker intended to punish his apprentice, the
son of a freeman, but accidentally put out his eye, it is
156 Gai. D. 13.6.18.1; Alf. D. 19.2.30.2
157 Paul. D. 9.2.18; 17.2.50; 19.2.43.
158 Ulp. D. 13.6.7; Paul. D. 44.7.34.2.
159 As Luebtow, supra note 113, at 36-37 and 66-88 does.
See Watson, Obligations, supra note 41 at 146; Hausmaninger , supra
note 114, at 37-38.
161 Luebtow, supra note 113, at 116.
162 D. 9.2.5.3.
163 D. 19 .2 . 13 .4
.
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disputed whether an aquilian actio was possible after Ulpian
and Julian as an actio utilis, an analogous action. 164 If
this was so this would mean an even more lenient remedy than
the estimation of damages according to the edictum de
aestimandis iniuriis with its threat of talio in the case of
failure to pay.
But the difficulty with this is that the lex Aquilia
provides for the payment of the value that the chattel had
in the preceding year, respectively month. This could not be
applied to freemen since they have no market value. 16 ^
Therefore I agree with the suggestion that these Ulpian-
fragments 166 were interpolated by Justinian's compilers and
that they originally dealt with the action by the father of
the apprentice against the shoemaker based upon the contract
of apprenticeship. 167 For the same reason, I can not agree
with Wittmann's theory that an actio legis Aquiliae utilis
was given in classical times at least for the bona fide
serviens168 who was injured. 169 Later, the compilers
164 assumed by S. Riccobono, Formulae Ficticiae A Normal Means of
Creating New Law, 9 TR 1 , 52 (1929) ; Wieacker, Textstufen klassischer Juristen
262 (1960) ; Heinrich Honsell & Theo Mayer -Maly et al .
, Roemisches Recht 367
(1987) .
165 Luebtow, supra note 113, at 118.
166 As well as D. 9.2.3.pr..
167 Luebtow, supra note 113, at 117-18 (and at 119-20 regarding D.
9.2.3.pr.); Kaser RP, supra note 13, § 144 II, at 520 n. 19; Max Kaser,
Review of Thomas, 84 SZ 546, 554 (1967); Franz Haymann, Textkri tische
Studien zum roemischen Obligationenrecht , 40 SZ 44, 50-61 n.l (1920).
And maybe even for other freemen: Wittmann, supra note 27, at 104.
169 Wittmann, supra note 27, at 76-83.
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changed these texts in order to make an actio legis Aquiliae
utilis applicable. 170
b) Self-help Eliminated from Earlier Texts :
Luzzatto points out that the elements of self-help which
existed in the earlier Roman Law later were eliminated from
the texts. 171 While in Ulpian D. 47.8.2.18 self-help was
still allowed, Institutiones 4,21 was changed172 in order
to make it consistent with the new theory. 173 Originally,
the text dealt with the problem whether an action for theft
lay if the robber by mistake thought that he was the owner
of the item he took away. The text reported that an
ignorance as to facts originally relieved the actor of the
responsibility but that later this was changed in order not
to give him a pretext to steal things without being
accountable. /An ignorantia iuris, an ignorance as to the
law, later was added to the ignorantia facti. The new
version provided that it was unlawful for somebody who
mistakenly regarded himself as the owner and mistakenly
thought that the law authorized the self-help by an owner,
to take away the chattel.
1 ~i r\
As to interpolations in further fragments, see Luebtow, supra note
113, at 120; see also Ulp
. D. 9.2.52.1 (shopkeeper tries to recover a
lantern from a thief, a scuffle develops and the eye of the thief is put
out) .
171 Giuseppe Luzzatto, supra note 10, at 36-38 & n.6.
Eduardo Volterra, Osservazioni sull' ignorantia iuris nel diritto
penale Romano, Bulletino dell' Istituto di Diritto Romano (BIDR) 1930, 75, 91-
92 .
173 Luzzatto, supra note 10, at 37.
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The inclusion of the ignorantia iuris changed the
underlying premise from the statement that self-help was
permitted for the owner, to the statement that it was an
error to think that self-help was allowed. 174
While the XII T. 8,13 made the endoplorare a prerequi-
site to the "emergency trial," the self-help which was
executed immediately after having caught the thief in the
act, the compilers of the Digest often omitted the
endoplorare . 175 This is a further indication that the
compilers did not view the "emergency trial" as the point of
the passage but instead changed its meaning into a text
about self-defense.
Similarly, in other texts, we find the emphasis shifted
from the self-help to the problem of self -defense
.
17 ^
Ulpian in Collatio 7,3,2 and 3 talks about the thief at
night and discusses a controversy whether self-help is
allowed
.
177
" (2) . . . [Pjroinde, si furem nocturnum, quern lex duodecim
tabularum omnimodo permittit occidere . . . (3) Et si qui
noctu furem occiderit, non dubitamus quin lege Aquiliae
(non) teneatur : sin autem, cum posset adprehendere , maluit
occidere , magis est, ut iniuria fecisse videatur ; ergo etiam
lege Cornelia tenebi tur .
"
178
174 Luzzatto, supra note 10, at 37
175 D. 9.2.4.1; D. 47.2.55.2.
Luzzatto, supra note 10, at 37
As to the actio for quadruple damages instead of killing the thief,
see supra F, a)
.
1 1 ft
"(2) If, then, a thief coming by night has been killed, as is
allowed by the XII tables in all circumstances . . .
. (3) In the case of
42
The same passage shows up in Ulpian D. 9.2.5.pr. but
the situation given has changed from a theft by night to a
situation that the thief attacks the owner.
The new rule of law is reflected in other fragments as
well which emphasize that self-help is forbidden and that
one may use force now only to defend oneself. 17
°
c) But Punitive Elements of the Lex Aquilia Preserved to a
Large Extent
:
aa) Calculation of Damages:
As explained in chapter F, d) , the remedy of the first
chapter of the lex Aquilia, the payment of the highest value
in the preceding year was (potentially) punitive and only
later complemented by (compensatory) notions of interesse
.
The original wording and therefore, the character, of the
third chapter is disputed. I agree with the view that it
originally was based upon notions of interesse and therefore
compensatory. Later, with the inclusion of inanimate
property into the scope of the lex Aquilia the wording and
the meaning were changed to a value-calculation which was
potentially punitive. Later this was changed again in favor
of an interesse-calculation
.
a thief killed by night, we have no doubt that the killer is not liable
under the lex Aquilia. But if he chose to kill the thief when he might
have arrested him, the better opinion is that it should be regarded as a
wrongful act. He will therefore be liable under the lex Cornelia."
179 Ulp. 48,8,9; J. Inst . 4.3.2; see Luzzatto, supra note 10, at 37-38.
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bb) Other Punitive Elements:
But since Justinian did not eliminate the other punitive
elements ( which were discussed above, F, e) the penal
character was to some extent preserved.
H. Conclusion for the Roman Law Part:
How can we summarize this issue? There is indirect evidence
of blood-feud and direct evidence of talio in the Twelve
Tables and earlier provisions. But we can not exclude the
possibility that these remedies were not in use contempora-
neously with damages.
In the times from which our written evidence dates,
blood- feud apparently had come out of use and after the
introduction of the praetorian edict de aestimandis iniuriis
talio must have become more and more seldom and later was
abolished by the compilers who made the lex Aquilia
applicable to injuries to a freeman.
The lex Aquilia contains a considerable number of
punitive elements which were later reduced but never
abolished altogether, even after the iudicia publica
developed and a distinction between private and criminal
proceedings was made
.
Though the remedy for furtum manifestum became more
lenient, it continued to be penal (quadruple damages)
.
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Therefore, we can conclude that there was a trend
towards more lenient remedies, 180 but even at the peak of
its development, Roman Law never completely abolished the
punitive element in tort damages.
180 quadruple damages - even if this leads to debt -servitude of an
insolvent tortfeasor - are certainly more lenient than immediate death.
Though it is arguable that talio (maiming the limb of the tortfeasor) is
not necessarily more lenient than the obligation of an insolvent
tortfeasor to pay damages, the tortfeasor will in most situations have
preferred to serve temporarily as a slave/prisoner than to be free but
without that limb.
III. AMERICAN LAW PART:
A; Scope of the Examination:
a) Basic Question:
The history of punitive damages in the Anglo-American law
originates in the 18th century. One of the earliest English
cases is Wilkes v. Wood. 181 As commentators remarked, most
of the early English cases seem to have been concerned with
the prevention of self-help. 182 They involved situations in
which the honor of the victim was affected, such as
"slander, seduction, assault and battery in humiliating
circumstances, . . . , malicious prosecution, . . . ,
trespass onto private land in an offensive manner, and false
imprisonment." 183 An offense to the honor of a person is
most likely to make the victim look for satisfaction by
revenge if the law does not provide a "valve" for the
feelings of anger and humiliation. 184 Soon afterwards,
punitive damages were recognized in American law as well and
were usually based on willful and wanton conduct. 185
98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763)
182 Dorsey D. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Damages, 56
S. Cal. L. Rev 1, 15 and 17-18 (1982), with further references;
similarly Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of
Punitive Damage Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers , 42 Am. U. L. Rev.
1269, 1291 (1993); Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44
Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1198-99 (1931).
183 Ellis, supra note 181, at 15, with references to English cases.
184 Ellis, supra note 181, at 17.
185 One of the earliest cases was Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77
(1791); more references in Rustad & Koenig, supra note 181, at 1291-92;
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It has already been mentioned in chapter II B,c) that
in contemporary American law punitive damages are awarded in
situations of aggravated circumstances, when tortfeasors act
maliciously, willfully or wantonly or in conscious disregard
of the interests of others. 186 In such cases, there is a
special need for punishment and deterrence. Accordingly, a
majority of courts acknowledges punishment and deterrence as
the basic policy underlying the doctrine of punitive
damages, whereas a minority views the purpose of punitive
damages as merely compensatory. If there is a situation of
aggravated circumstances, the plaintiffs are exposed to a
special insult, "mental distress," 187 "vexation" 188 or
injury to their feelings. 189 According to the minority,
punitive damages serve the purpose to compensate the
plaintiffs for the hurt feelings which arise form the fact
that they have been treated outrageously or maliciously,
they are a kind of "augmented compensation." 190
The concept of punitive damages has been much criti-
cized. One of the arguments against them is that in a
developed society, punishment and deterrence should be left
to the Criminal Law and that therefore, punitive damages
some courts still mention the role of punitive damages as a substitute
for private revenge, see e.g. Perry v. Melton, 299 S . E . 2d 8, 13 (W.Va.
1982) .
186 See supra note 9.
187 Kewin v. Massachusetts Mut . Life Ins., Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 and
62 (Mich. 1980)
.
188 Id. at 55 and 62.
189 McChesney v. Wilson, 93 N.W. 627 (Mich. 1903).
190 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 181, at 1321-22.
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should be eliminated from Private Law. 191 A typical example
for the polemic style in which the debate is led is the
statement " [i] s not punishment out of place, irregular,
anomalous, exceptional, unjust, unscientific, not to say
absurd and ridiculous, when classed among civil reme-
dies?" 192
The notion of punishment depends on moral theory and
its validity can not be tested empirically. 193 But the
statement that punitive damages are outdated and have to
vanish in a civilized society is suitable to be tested
empirically. It is possible that one merely wants to get rid
of some unfortunate economical consequences of punitive
damages but that the notion of punishment and deterrence is
still being acknowledged. If so, it would be sufficient to
limit punitive damages but there would be no need to abolish
them altogether.
In the light of the conclusion for the Roman Law
chapter, I will examine if there is a trend in the decisions
of the majority of courts away from the punitive element. If
those courts which state that punishment and deterrence are
the basis of punitive damages do not apply their own theory
consistently when dealing in practice with problems
involving punitive damages this would be an indication that
the concept actually is on the wane in modern times.
191 Sales & Cole, supra note 3.
192 Sales & Cole, supra note 3, at 1159, citing Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H.
342, 382 (1873) .
193 Ellis, supra note 181, at 4.
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I will examine what role notions of punishment and of
compensation play in the reasoning of courts. If there is a
situation in which the punishment purpose of punitive
damages can not be achieved - if the only remaining purpose
could be compensation - how do the courts deal with that
situation? Or if there is a conflict between the punishment
purpose and the compensation purpose of damages, which one
prevails?
After screening out the states which do not allow
punitive damages, those which adhere to the view that
punitive damages were compensatory and those in which a
statute states the purpose of punitive damages so that there
is nothing left for the courts to determine, I will give a
brief overview over the arguments against and in favor of
punitive damages and over some examples of measures taken
against punitive damages, and will finally single out some
situations which can serve as indicators whether the
majority of courts lets the punishment purpose prevail as a
matter of practice.
b) States which do not Recognize Punitive Damages
Louisiana194 (does not recognize punitive damages
unless authorized by statute. Therefore, there are no
genuine common law damages in Louisiana. And if the courts
deal with punitive damages based on statute their decisions
194 McCoy v. Arkansas Natural Gas C, 143 So. 383, 386 (La. 1932);
Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1988).
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rather reflect the attitude of the legislature towards
punitive damages than that of the judiciary. Since the
purpose of this thesis is to find out to what extent the
courts are committed to preserving the punitive element in
tort law, states which do not recognize common law punitive
damages are outside the scope of this thesis.)
Massachusetts
,
195 South Dakota196 and Washington 191
(adhere to the same rule as Louisiana.)
Colorado198 (in the last century decided that punitive
damages can not be awarded under common law. In reaction to
this decision, a statute was adopted as stated in Mailloux
v. Bradley. 199 Today, punitive damages are allowable only
if provided for in a statute. 200 Therefore, Colorado falls
into basically the same category as Louisiana.)
Nebraska201 (recognizes only compensatory damages)
.
Connecticut202 (limits the "punitive" damages recover-
able to the costs of litigation.)
Michigan202 and New Hampshire204 courts do not allow a
separate amount for punishment although they view it as
195 City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d 265,
272 (Mass. 1943) .
196 Kjerstad v. Ravellette Publications, Inc., 517 N.W.2d 419 (S.D.
1993) and S.D. Codified Laws Ann . §21-1-4 (1987) (no punitive damages
unless expressly authorized by statute)
.
197 Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp., 635 P. 2d 708, 711 (Wash. 1981);
Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 25 P. 1072, 1074-75 (Wash. 1891).
198 Murphy v. Hobbs 5 P. 119 (Colo. 1884) .
199 643 p 2d 797( 799 (Colo App 1982)
.
200 Ballow v. Phico Ins. Co., 878 P. 2d 672 (Colo. 1994).
201 Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Neb. 1960).
202 Kelsey v. Connecticut State Employees Ass'n, 427 A. 2d 420, 425
(Conn. 1980) .
203 Wise v. Daniel, 190 N.W. 746, 747 (Mich. 1922) .
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permissible to increase the amount of compensatory damages
in aggravated cases. This seems to be a form of punishment
as well, but since the two states prefer to label it
otherwise and since therefore the nature of the award is
unclear, Michigan and New Hampshire can be screened out, as
well
.
c) States which view punitive damages as compensation for
hurt feelings:
Connecticut, 205 Michigan, 206 and New Hampshire207 view
the nature of punitive damages as compensatory, since they
permit punitive damages only for the expenses of litigation
or permit only an enhancement of compensatory damages. 208
d) States in which Statutory Provisions Determine the Nature
of Punitive Damages:
Georgia provides in Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-5. 1(c) (Supp.
1995) that punitive damages are awarded for punishment and
deterrence. Since the legislature has already regulated the
issue, the courts decisions rather reflect the view of the
legislature about punitive damages than their own view.
Since the basic question is whether those courts which state
that the purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter
204 Vratsenes v. New Hampshire Auto, Inc., 289 A. 2d 66, 68 (N.H. 1972),
same as in Michigan.
205 Bodner v. Limited Services Auto Ass'n, 610 A. 2d 1212 (Conn. 1992).
206 Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Tri-City Motors and Sports, Inc., 429
N.W.2d 871 (Mich. 1988); see also the reference supra note 202.
207 Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456 (N.H. 1976) .
208 See supra note 201-203 and accompanying text.
51
apply their theories consistently, the states in which the
purpose is determined by statute are less suitable to be
examined.
Montana has a similar provision in Mont. Code Ann. § 27-
1-220 (1) (1994) .
In Nevada, punitive damages are awarded "for the sake
of example and by way of punishing the defendant," Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 42 . 005 (1) (1993) .
North Carolina regulates punitive damages in N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 1D-1 (1995) : the policy is "to punish a defendant
for egregiously wrongful acts and to deter the defendants
and others from committing similar wrongful acts."
North Dakota's N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-11(1) (Supp.
1995) contains a provision similar to the one in North
Carolina
.
e) The Remaining States which recognize the Punishment
Purpose are
;
Alabama, 209 Alaska, 210 Arizona, 211 Arkansas, 212
California, 213 Delaware, 214 District of Columbia, 215
209 Schwertfeger v. Moorehouse, 569 So. 2d 322 (Ala. 1990); Reserve Nat
Ins. Co. v. Crowell, 614 So. 2d 1005 (Ala. 1993), cert, denied, 114 S . Ct
84, 126 L.Ed. 2d 52 (1993)
.
210 Barber v. National Bank of Alaska, 815 P. 2d 857 (Alaska 1991).
211 Volz v. Coleman Co., Inc., 748 P. 2d 1191 (Ariz. 1987).
212 Wheeler Motor Co., Inc. v. Roth, 867 S.W.2d 446 (Ark. 1993); Cater
v. Cater, 846 S.W.2d 173 (Ark. 1993).
213 Adams v. Murakami, 813 P. 2d 1348 (Cal . 1991).
214 Strauss v. Briggs
, 525 A. 2d 992 (Del. 1987).
215 Nepera Chemical, Inc. v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 794 F.2d 688, 253
U.S. App. D.C. 394 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
52
Florida, 216 Hawaii, 217 Idaho, 218 Illinois, 219 Indiana, 220
Iowa, 221 Kansas, 222 Kentucky, 223 Maine, 224 Maryland, 225
Minnesota, 226 Mississippi, 227 Missouri, 228 New Jersey, 229
New Mexico, 230 New York, 231 Ohio, 232 Oklahoma, 233
Oregon, 234 Pennsylvania, 235 Rhode Island, 236 Tennessee, 237
Texas, 238 Utah, 239 Vermont, 240 Virginia241 West
Virginia, 242 Wisconsin, 243 and Wyoming. 244
216 Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 1994) .
217 Kuhnert v. Allison, 868 P. 2d 457 (Haw. 1994); Masaki v. General
Motors Corp., 780 P. 2d 566 (Haw. 1989).
218 Curtis v. Firth, 850 P. 2d 749 (Idaho 1993).
219 Loitz v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 563 N.E.2d 397 (111. 1990).
220 orkin Exterminating Co. v. Traina, 486 N.E.2d 1019 (Ind. 1986),
disagreed with by multiple cases on other grounds as stated in Obremski
v. Henderson, 487 N.E.2d 827 (Ind. App . 1 Dist., 1986), transf . to 497
N.E.2d 909 (Ind. 1986)
.
221 Economy Roofing & Insulating Co. v. Zumaris, 538 N.W.2d 641 (Iowa
1995)
.
222 Cerretti v. Flint Hills Rural Elec. Co-op. Ass'n, 837 P. 2d 330
(Kans. 1992) .
223 Harrod v. Fraley, 289 S.W.2d 203 (Ky. 1956).
224 Foss v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 309 A. 2d 339, 345 (Me. 1973).
225 ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 667 A. 2d 116 (Md. 1995); Ellerin v. Fairfax
Savings, F.S.B., 652 A. 2d 1117 (Md. 1995).
226 Rosenbloom v. Flygare, 501 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. 1993)
.
227 James W. Sessums Timber Co., Inc. v. McDaniel, 635 So. 2d 875 (Miss.
1994)
228 Boyer v. Grandview Manor Care Center, Inc., 759 S.W.2d 230 (Mo. Ct
.
App. 1988), on remand 805 S.W.2d 187, reh'g, transfer denied.
229 Fischer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 512 A. 2d 466 (N.J. 1986)
230 Albuquerque Concrete Coring Co., Inc. v. Pan Am World Services,
Inc., 879 P. 2d 772 (N.M. 1994); Clay v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 881 P. 2d 11
(N.M. 1994), cert, denied, 115 S . Ct . 1102, 130 L.Ed. 2d 1069.
231 Zurich Ins. Co. v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 1065
(N.Y. 1994) .
232 Moskovitz v. Mt . Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1994).
233 Wagner v. Bennett, 814 P. 2d 476 (Okla. 1991).
234 Huffman and Wright Logging Co. v. Wade, 857 P. 2d 101 (Or. 1993).
235 Rizzo v. Haines, 555 A. 2d 58 (Pa. 1989); Schecter v. Watkins, 577
A. 2d 585, 395 Pa. Super 363 (1990), appeal denied, 584 A. 2d 320.
236 Picard v. Barry Pontiac-Buick, Inc., 654 A. 2d 690 (R.I. 1995);
Soares v. Ann & Hope of Rhode Island, Inc., 637 A. 2d 339 (R.I. 1994).
237 Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Stevenson, 368 S.W.2d 760 (Tenn. 1963).
238 George Grubbs Enterprises, Inc. v. Blien, 900 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.
1995); Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
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These 36 states recognize a pure form of punitive
damages. Additionally, the five states enumerated in the
previous chapter245 recognize a form of common law punitive
damages which is only partially regulated by statute. In
other words, 41 out of 50 jurisdictions appear to recognize
some punitive component to tort remedies. The examination
will focus on the 36 states with the purest form of common
law punitive damages.
B: Criticism about Punitive Damages:
Rationales given to justify punitive damages are that they
punish the defendants and deter them and others from similar
conduct in the future, and thus benefit the society. 246
Besides, courts still mention their role as a substitute for
private revenge. 247 Other justifications are that they
induce private law enforcement by providing an incentive for
plaintiffs to sue. This is particularly necessary where
239 Terry v.. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Institution, 605 P. 2d 314, on
rehearing 617 P. 2d 700 (Utah 1980), overruled on other grounds, 678 P. 2d
298 (1984)
.
240 d'Arc Turcotte v. Estate of LaRose, 569 A. 2d 1086 (1989).
241 Hamilton Development Co. v. Broad Rock Club, Inc., 445 S.E.2d 140
(Va. 1994) .
242 Shrewsberry v. Aztec Sales & Service Co., Inc., 445 S.E.2d 253
(W.Va. 1994), (punishment); Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8 (W.Va. 1982),
(primarily punishment and deterrence, but as a side-effect also
additional compensation); C.W. Development, Inc. v. Structures, Inc. of
West Virginia, 408 S.E.2d 41 (W.Va. 1991).
243 Management Computer Services, Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co.,
539 N.W.2d 111 (Wis. Ct . App . 1995), review granted, 546 N.W.2d 468
(1996) .
244 Parker v. Artery, 889 P. 2d 520 (Wyo. 1995).
245 Chapter III A,d)
.
246 Ellis, supra note 181, at 4-9; Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin,
Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 7-8 (1990)
.
247 Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8, 13 (W.Va. 1982) .
54
there are "gaps" in the criminal law, 248 or where a
comparatively minor harm is done to a large number of people
and where the expenses of litigation otherwise would prevent
the victims from suing. 249 It also has been noted that the
busy government agencies and attorneys general have not been
very efficient in preventing harm done by faulty
products. 250 Having such "private law enforcement" is
preferable to having a huge costly government
bureaucracy
.
251
On the other hand, punitive damages have been criti-
cized as being unconstitutional for imposing a "double
jeopardy" on defendants who are prosecuted criminally as
well, for violating the excessive fines clause of U.S.
Const, amend. VIII or for denying the defendant the due
process right protected by the U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
The double jeopardy argument has been rejected by the
U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Halper252 because
the fifth amendment is not applicable if a private party
seeks a remedy. In TXO Products Corp. 252 it upheld an award
under the fifth and eighth amendment although the punitive
damages award was 526 times the actual damages.
248 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 181, at 1323-25.
249 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 181, at 1324.
250 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 181, at 1325-26 and 1329 n. 299: for
example none of the asbestos manufacturers whose products caused lung
diseases in thousands of people have been prosecuted criminally for
concealing the dangers of exposure to asbestos.
251 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 181, at 1325.
252 490 U.S. 435, 450, 109 S . Ct . 1892, 1903 (1989).
253 TXO Products Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 113
S.Ct. 2711 (1993)
.
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Two other Supreme Court decisions dealt with the due
process argument. In Haslip, 254 the Supreme Court held that
an amount of punitive damages which was four times the
amount of compensatory damages did not violate the due
process clause. But in a recent decision, BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore255 it held that extremely dispropor-
tionate amounts such as punitive damages 500 times the
amount of compensatory damages can violate the due process
clause. These two decisions will be discussed in the context
of the requirement of a ratio between punitive and compensa-
tory damages. 256
Others criticize punitive damages from a fairness
viewpoint. They argue that punitive damages are not just
punishment because the standards for awarding them and for
determining the appropriate amount were too unclear and the
verdicts therefore were unpredictable, arbitrary and often
violating the right to equal treatment if tortfeasors were
assessed different amounts of damages for a comparable
misconduct
.
257
Apart from criticism about awarding punitive damages in
particular situations 258 the concept of punitive damages
itself has frequently been criticized as creating a "tort
254 Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 133 L.Ed. 2d 1,
111 S.Ct. 1032 (1991)
.
255 116 S.Ct. 1589 (May 20, 1996).
256 In chapter III D,b)
.
257 Ellis, supra note 181, at 7.
o c p3 For example in the vicarious liability context, see Sales & Cole,
supra note 3, at 1154-57; or in the strict liability context which
allegedly leads to overdeterrence, see Sales & Cole, supra note 3, at
1140-41.
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crisis," increasing litigation costs and costs of products
and discouraging manufacturers to put beneficial products on
the market. 259 But others objected that the debate has been
highly politicized, focusing on a few spectacular tort cases
without ever giving any reliable data as to how often and in
what amounts punitive damages actually are awarded. 260 They
advocate a more skeptical approach and argue that one has to
obtain more data before one can judge whether there actually
is a crisis. 261
Absent these empirical data, one can not yet argue
what ought to be done. But the question whether some of the
rationales underlying punitive damages, the rationales of
punishment and deterrence, are still regarded as valid is
suitable to be tested empirically.
C: Measures taken against Punitive Damages:
a) On State Level:
In the 1980s, many states enacted tort reform statutes.
Since giving full account of the various ways to restrict
punitive damages exceeds the limits of a thesis, I will give
only a few examples. 262
259 Sales & Cole, supra note 3, at 1154-57; see also references in
Daniels & Martin, supra note 245, at 4.
260 Daniels & Martin, supra note 245, at 2-3; see also id. at 9-27
which analyzes the tactics of the opponents of punitive damages when
presenting "reliable data" and when dealing with the press.
261 Thomas A. Eaton & Susette Talarico, Toward Informed Policy MAKING:
Social Science and Data Collection - A Proposal for Georgia, 1-3 and 51-55
(unpublished); Daniels & Martin, supra note 245, at 1-4.
For a (non-exhaustive) summary, see Eaton & Talarico, supra note
260, Appendix A, page A-l to A-357.
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Some states put caps on the amount of damages. 263
Another way to limit punitive damages is to enhance the
procedural prerequisites for awarding them: Some states
provide for a bifurcated trial for compensatory and punitive
damages, 264 others define prerequisites as "clear and
convincing" evidence or "malice" more narrowly. 265 Some
impose time-based restrictions by modifying statutes of
limitations and statutes of repose or provide for a
compulsory pre-filing screening. 266
Another indirect restriction reduces the incentive to
sue by providing that a certain percentage of punitive
damages has to be paid to state funds. 267 All these reforms
are aimed at restricting punitive damages but do not
eliminate them. This indicates that the states are committed
to continuing a punitive element in tort law.
b) Recent Efforts on the Federal Level:
On February 15, 1995, House bill 965 was introduced, 268
which originally was intended as a total overhaul of the
civil litigation system. But the House dropped this idea in
favor of a mere product liability reform, because the
263 See eg 0kla _ stat. Ann. tit. 23 § 9.1 (Suppl. 1996) (depending on
the degree of culpabilty punitive damages may not exceed the greater of
either the amount of compensatory damages or $100,000 or $500,000).
264 See e g Mo _ ANN _ Stat _ §5io.263(l) (Vernon Supp . 1992).
265 See e g Tex _ Civ _ pRAC _ & Rem _ Code Ann> §41.001(2) and (7) (Supp.
1996)
.
266 See e g Ala _ Code §6-5-551 (Supp. 1996).
267 See eg FLA _ STAT. Ann. ch. 768.73(2) (1994) (split recovery
statute)
.
268 H.R. 965, 104th Cong., 1st session (1996).
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broader measure was opposed by the Senate. 269 A compromise
bill was drafted which limited punitive damages in cases
involving faulty products, regardless of whether the lawsuit
is brought in a federal or a state court, while preserving
the possibility to obtain compensatory damages.
The bill contains, amongst others, provisions abolish-
ing joint and several liability for non-economic loss,
provisions about the statute of limitations and statute of
repose, and about limits on awards of punitive damages.
Section 108 (b) limits awards against large businesses to the
greater of two times the total of economic and non-economic
damages or $250,000. Awards against small businesses are
limited to the lesser of the two limits. The judge can award
an additional amount if the original amount is "insufficient
to punish the egregious conduct of the defendant" (emphasis
added)
.
The criteria which determine if additional punitive
damages are warranted270 are related to the degree of
culpability or to the degree to which deterrence is
necessary.
This legislation was vetoed by the president on May 2,
1996. 27i on May 9, 1996, the House upheld the veto of the
269 N.Y. Times, House G.O.P. Quits Tort Reform Plan, Al
,
(March 7,
1996)
.
270 Sec. 108(b) 3(B): " [T] he extent to which the defendant acted with
actual malice" - "the likelihood that serious harm would arise" - "the
attitude and conduct of the defendant upon the discovery of the
misconduct
. .
.
"
- "the cumulative deterrent effect of other losses .
.
suffered by the defendant as a result of the misconduct ..."
271 54 Congressional Quarterly, Weekly Report, No. 18, at 1220 (May 4, 1996);
text of the veto, see id. at 1253.
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bill 272 "confirming that such legislation is dead for the
year.
"
273
The bill did not try to abolish punitive damages
completely. At present, one apparently can not expect more
than a political consensus to limit them. Moreover, this
unsuccessful attempt to impose restrictions upon them
clearly reflected notions of punishment and deterrence. This
intimates that the legislature did value the punitive and
deterrent effect of exemplary damages and that the reform
rather was directed against some of the unwanted conse-
quences of punitive damages than against the concept itself
.
D: The Purposes of Punishment and Deterrence in the Courts'
Decisions :
a) Do Courts Permit Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages?
A tortfeasor who can shift the burden of an award of
punitive damages to his insurer does not feel the sanction -
apart from increased insurance premiums which is an indirect
sanction and, compared to the award itself, a minor burden.
Instead, the loss is spread amongst the insured. This means
that the punitive and deterrent effect of punitive damages
is considerably reduced, if not eliminated.
The jurisdictions which view the primary purpose of
punitive damages as punishment and deterrence are about
272 With a 258-163 vote, which was 23 votes short of the two-thirds
majority required for an override, see id., No. 19, at 1294 (May 11,
1996)
.
273 54 Congressional Quarterly, supra note 245, No. 19, at 1294 (May 11,
1996) .
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equally split as to whether an insurance contract covering
punitive damages 274 is void as violating public policy. But
it is worth a closer look at what rationales the courts give
for their decisions.
There is a broad consensus that an insurance policy
does not require the insurer to pay damages for the inten-
tional conduct of the insured275 because the insured "may
not acquire a license to engage in" wrongful activity. 276
But there is controversy as to whether public policy should
preclude coverage of punitive damages founded upon gross or
wanton negligence or reckless conduct. Arizona, 277 Ar-
kansas, 278 Idaho, 279 Kansas, 280 Maryland, 281
274 rphg question of the construction of insurance policies is outside
the scope of the examination.
275 See e.g. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 440
S.W.2d 582, 584 (Ark. 1969); Continental Ins. Cos. v. Hancock, 507
S.W.2d 146, 151 (Ky. 1973); Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P. 2d
1013, at 1016 (Or. 1977); Aetna Casualty & Sur . Co. v. Roe, 650 A. 2d 94
100 ( Pa. Super. Ct . 1994); Continental Casualty Co. v. Fibreboard
Corp., 762 F.Supp. 1368, 1374-75 (N.D. Cal . 1991) (applying Texas law),
appeal dismissed and remanded, 4 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. Ca . 1993); Hensley
v. Erie Ins. Co., 283 S.E.2d 227, 230 (W.Va. 1981); the only exception
is Kansas: Golf Course Superintendents Ass'n v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London, 761 F.Supp. 1485, 1491 (D.C. Kan. 1991) (applying Kansas law)
(mentioning that Kan. Stat. Ann. § 40-2,115 became effective in 1984,
stating that it was not against public policy to obtain insurance
covering liability for punitive damages arising out of intentional
conduct)
.
276 Norfolk v. Western Ry. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 420
F.Supp. 92, 95 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (applying Indiana and Mississippi law).
277 pr iCe v . Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 502 P. 2d 522 (Ariz. 1972).
278 Southern Farm, 440 S.W.2d 582; California Union Ins. Co. v.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 572 S.W.2d 393 (Ark. 1978).
279 Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v United States Fire Ins. Co.,
511 P. 2d 783 (Idaho 1973).
280 Guarantee Abstract & Title Co. v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co.,
618 P. 2d 1195, (Kan. 1980) , disapproved of in part on appeal after
remand, on other grounds, 652 P. 2d 665 (1982); Golf Course Superinten-
dents Ass'n v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 761 F.Supp. 1485 (D.C.
Kan. 1991) (applying Kansas law) (issue is regulated by statute).
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b)Do Punitive Damages Have to Bear a Particular Relationship
to the Amount of Compensatory Damages?
In order to allow the defendants to calculate their exposure
to risks and in order to give them a fair warning before-
hand, some limits have to be placed onto the amount of
punitive damages. The permissible amount can be limited in
several ways. First, one could set up a fixed amount as a
ceiling; or one could require that the amount of punitive
damages must bear a specified relationship to the degree of
outrageousness or to the wealth of the wrongdoer or that the
punitive damages award be some multiple of the compensatory
damages
.
The advantage of the first option is that it provides
the highest degree of certainty. But the disadvantage is
that it might prevent courts from adequately punishing
extremely outrageous conduct or from making an extremely
wealthy defendant feel the sanction.
The second option best advances the goal of punishment
and deterrence because the more outrageous the conduct of
the wrongdoer the higher the culpability, and the wealthier
the defendant is the higher the award against him has to be
in order to deter him. But it is difficult to measure the
culpability of the conduct in terms of money.
It is easier to take the amount of compensatory damages
as a guideline because both punitive damages and compensa-
tory damages are amounts of money and can be compared
easily. On the other hand, a tortfeasor can cause great harm
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when acting only slightly culpable or can act extremely
malicious and nevertheless cause only little harm. The harm
caused - in other words: the amount of compensatory damages
- is not necessarily related to the culpability and the need
for punishment.
Courts which require punitive damages to bear a rela-
tionship to compensatory damages do not completely frustrate
the purpose of punitive damages. But adopting a ratio rule
indicates that they do not value punishment and deterrence
very high. Possibly they even want to provide a victim which
suffered much with some additional compensation.
Therefore, determining how many courts adhere to a
ratio rule can be an indicator how serious the courts take
the theories about the nature of punitive damages which they
themselves adopted.
The U.S. Supreme Court in Browning-Ferris318 refused
to "craft some common-law standard of excessiveness that
relies on notions of proportionality between punitive and
compensatory damages, . . ., these are matters of state, and
not federal, common law." 319 In Haslip320 it viewed an
award of punitive damages which was four times the amount of
compensatory damages as not violating the due process clause
of U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
JJ
-° Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed. 2d 219, (1989), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1236.
319 Browning-Ferris at 492 U.S. 257, 279; 109 S.Ct. 2909, 2922.
320 Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 133 L.Ed. 2d 1,
111 S.Ct. 1032 (1991)
.
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In a more recent case, BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore321 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a punitive
damages award by an Alabama court as excessive and violating
the due process clause. The purchaser of a car sued the
automobile manufacturer, BMW, for fraud. The car had been
damaged prior to delivery and was repainted by BMW.
According to the plaintiff's expert, this reduced the value
of the car by approximately ten percent. BMW had, following
its nationwide policy, not disclosed the fact that the car
had been repainted. In other jurisdictions this conduct was
viewed as lawful. The plaintiff was awarded $4,000 in
compensatory and $4 million in punitive damages but the
award was reduced by the Alabama Supreme Court to $2
million. In a 5:4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court found
that the amount was grossly excessive and violated the due
process clause of the U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
One argument for the excessiveness was the 500 to 1
ratio of punitive to compensatory damages. 322
The court set up three factors which determined whether the
defendant was given the due fair notice as to the severity
of the penalty which it had to expect. The first factor is
the relationship between the punitive damages and the harm
done. 323 The second is that there may not be a gross
disparity to other civil and criminal penalties for
321 116 S.Ct. 1589 (May 20, 1996)
322 Id. at 1602.
323 Id. at 1601-1602.
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right 348 and "over-punish" 349 him. Another problem is that
awarding punitive damages to the first plaintiff could mean
to exhaust the funds by which subsequent plaintiffs can be
compensated. 350
Commentators have proposed remedies all of which have
their flaws:
Statutory caps on punitive damages providing that punitive
damages may not exceed a certain amount or a certain
percentage of compensatory damages; 351 more frequent use of
the procedural mechanisms of remittitur and the motion for
new trial 352 and class action certification which
determines the number of claims arising from the misconduct
of the defendant and deals with them in a single action
which allows the court to make a full assessment of the
total of punitive damages to be awarded. 353
Some courts stated that under the present law they see
no way to achieve a satisfactory result. 354 When a court
348 Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 718 F . Supp . 1233, 1234-35 (D. N.J.
1989) ; In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD
Products Liability Litigation, 526 F . Supp . 887, 899 (N.D. Cal . 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir . Cal. 1982), cert,
denied, A.K. Robins Co. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); contra: Cathey v.
Johns -Manvi lie Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1571 (6th Cir. Term. 1985),
cert, denied, 487 U.S. 1021 (1986)
.
349 N. Todd. Leishman, Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp. : Toward Due
Process Limitations on Multiple Awards of Punitive Damages in Mass Tort
Litigation, 1990 Utah L. Rev. 439, 440 (1990) .
350 Cathey v. Johns -Manvi lie Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1569 (6th Cir.
Term. 1985) .
351 Leishman, supra note 348, at 448-49. The disadvantages have been
discussed in the previous chapter, III D b)
.
352 Leishman, supra note 348, at 450-52.
353 Leishman, supra note 348, a: 452-57: But the problem is that the
prerequisites for a class certification are not always met.
354 Maxey v. Freightliner Corp. 450 F . Supp . 955, 962 (N.D. Tex. 1978),
aff'd 632 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. Tex. 1980), reh
' g granted 634 F.2d 1008
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awards punitive damages it does not yet know how many other
lawsuits are pending in other courts and how many will be
filed, how many of them will result in judgments in favor of
the plaintiff and, if so, what the amount awarded will be.
So it can not adjust its own award accordingly. Besides, the
courts are unable to "prohibit subsequent awards in other
courts" against the same defendant if the amount has reached
dangerous dimensions. 355 In most cases, the court has to
chose between preventing the present plaintiffs from
recovering punitive damages in the lawsuit at stake or to
potentially put the defendant in danger of facing bank-
ruptcy. The first option is feasible because it is agreed
that plaintiffs do not have a right to punitive damages, 356
but this would mean to incur the risk that the defendant
will not be punished as severe as he (it) deserves, or will
not be punished at all. 357 The second option means to
potentially exhaust the available funds so that subsequent
plaintiffs will not even get compensatory damages.
Some states have taken legislative measures against
the threat of bankruptcy. Kansas provides that punitive
damages may not exceed the lesser of either the annual gross
(5th Cir. Tex. 1980) (applying Texas law); Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-40 (2nd Cir. N.Y. 1987) (applying N.Y.
law) ; see also Leishman, supra note 316, at 444.
355 Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell , Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-40 (2nd
Cir. N.Y. 1987) (applying N.Y. law); Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 71f
F.Supp. 1233, 1236 (D. N.J. 1989).
356 For references, see 22 Am. Jur . 2d Damages §739 (1988) .
apart from compensatory damages which are some form of sanction as
well
.
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income of the defendant or $5 million, 358 Missouri provides
that a defendant may file a motion asking the court to
credit the award of punitive damages with amounts of
punitive damages previously paid for the same misconduct
except for enumerated intentional torts 359 and Texas limits
of punitive damages to the greater of twice the amount of
economic damages, plus the amount of non-economic damages or
$200,000, unless the act is at the same time one of the
enumerated felonies. 360
But very few courts have solved the dilemma by sacri-
ficing the punishment of the defendant to the compensation
of future plaintiffs by denying punitive damages awards in
mass litigation cases. 361
358 Unless the amount is inadequate to penalize the defendant or the
profitability exceeds the punishment, Kan. Stat. Ann. §60-3702 (e) (Supp.
1991) , the provision does not mention if the total amount of punitive
damages is meant or amount for each individual plaintiff, but §60-3702
(b) (7) provides that other awards of punitive damages have to be taken
into account
.
359 Mo. Ann. Stat. §510.263 (Vernon Supp. 1992).
360 Tex Civ _ prac. Sc Rem. Code Ann. §41.008 (Supp. 1996).
361 In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products
Liability Litigation, 526 F.Supp. 887, 899-900 (N.D. Cal . 1981), vacated
on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. Cal. 1982), cert, denied, A.H.
Robins Co. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); in Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading
Corp., 705 F.Supp. 1053, 1064 (D. N.J. 1989) the court held that
multiple awards violated the defendant's due process rights and that the
plaintiff's claims for punitive damages would be stricken if the
defendant could produce proof of earlier awards paid, but upon
reconsideration, 718 F.Supp. 1233, 1235-36 (D.C. N.J. 1989), the court
vacated its earlier judgment because "it would not be fair to bar
plaintiffs by reason of the conduct of other litigants in other actions
. . . and the court is powerless to limit other courts from considering
other . . . punitive damages claims against the same defendant" and thus
can not protect the defendant's due process rights,- In re A.H. Robins
Co., 89 BR 555, 561-63 (E.D. Va . 1988) (denying all punitive damages
claims, not only because the defendant would be over-punished by
multiple claims but also under the equity powers of the bankruptcy court
in order to give the company a opportunity to reorganize); Sanford v.
Celotex Corp., 598 F.Supp. 529, 531 (M.D. Tenn . 1984).
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All the other cases examined permitted multiple awards.
Some of them allowed a mitigated type of multiple awards,
holding that "deterrence resulting from current and
prospective suits against the defendant" must be considered
as a factor when assessing the amount of punitive dam-
ages . 362
Few resorted to class certification. 363
The remaining courts either were able to ignore the
problems of potential bankruptcy because the statute of
limitations had run and "the number of plaintiffs was
therefore set," 364 or they held that the risk of bankruptcy
362 Farall v. A.C. & S. Co., 558 A. 2d 1078, 1082 (Del. Super. Ct . 1989)
(several hundreds of claims had been filed in this asbestos case)
;
Johns -Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 253 (Fla. Ct
.
App. 1084), review denied, 467 So. 2d 999 (1985), disapproved of on other
grounds by Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1986) as stated
in 553 So. 2d 274 (1990) (asbestos case) (holding that previous and
expected punitive damages awards may mitigate instant award) ; similarly
Hazelwood v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R., 450 N.E.2d 1199, 1207 (111. Ct
.
App. 1983) (personal injury claim against railroad company which had
failed to maintain a crossing in safe condition) ; Wangen v. Ford Motor
Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 450-60 (Wis. 1980) (defective automobile tank which
ruptured and burned causing injuries and deaths of people) ("The danger
of excessive multiple punitive damages claims can be avoided . . .
because the jury may consider . . . punitive damages . . . already
imposed on a defendant or likely to be imposed on the defendant.")
.
363 In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products
Liability Litigation, 526 F . Supp . 887, 899-900 (N.D. Cal . 1981), vacated
on other grounds, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. Cal. 1982), cert, denied, A.H.
Robins Co. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); Fischer v. Johns -Manville
Corp., 512 A. 2d 466, 478-79 (N.J. 1986) (asbestos case) (class
certification in order to avoid overkill by multiple awards) ; In re
"Agent Orange" Products Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 729 (E.D. N.Y.
1983), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1004
(1988) (herbicide spray which injured soldiers in Vietnam); Ouellette v.
International Paper Co., 86 F.R.D. 476 (D. Vt . 1980), aff'd, 116 F.2d 55
(2d Cir. 1985), cert, granted, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986) (discharge of
waste) .
364 State ex rel
. Young v. Crookham, 618 P. 2d 1268 (Or. 1980) (exposure
to bacteria resulting in gastrointestinal illness while visiting a lake
lodge) (at 1274: the statute of limitations had run; at 1274: rejecting
the "first comer"/ "one bite" theory)
.
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or of depleting the funds for the compensation of subsequent
plaintiffs was not a sufficient argument to prohibit awards
of punitive damages, and that there was no other way than to
accept these risks. 365
365 Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell , Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 839-41 (2nd
Cir. N.Y. 1987) (applying N.Y. law) (injuries caused by the drug
"MER/2 9") (holding that it would be unfair to limit recovery to the
first comers and to "leave it to the court to put a stop to the award of
damages at some unascertained point of time"); Jackson v. Johns -Manville
Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 407 (5th Cir. Miss. 1986), cert, denied, 478
U.S. 1022 (1986) (applying Mississippi law) (asbestos case); Moran v.
Johns -Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 817 (6th Cir. Ohio 1982)
(applying Ohio law) (asbestos case) ("one bite" theory rejected); Cathey
v. Johns -Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1570 (6th Cir. Tenn . 1985)
(asbestos case) (rejecting overkill doctrine; rejecting the exhaustion
of resources argument as a basis for denying punitive damages recovery)
;
Dykes v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 801 F.2d 810, 819 (6th Cir. Tenn.
1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987), (applying Tennessee law)
(asbestos case) (rejecting overkill doctrine which suggests that
multiple awards create overkill and threaten recovery of any award by
subsequent plaintiffs); Vollert v. Summa Corp., 389 F . Supp . 1348, 1351
(D.C. Hawaii 1975) (applying Hawaii law) (products liability action
because of defect in helicopter causing an accident) ("It would require
a substantial change in the law to hold that simply because there might
be other suits filed against the defendant, punitive damages should not
be allowed."); Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 374 F.Supp. 850, 856-57
(M.D. Pa. 1974) (applying Pennsylvania law) (involving the drug "Aralen"
causing impairment of vision); Maxey v. Freightliner Corp. 450 F.Supp.
955, 962-63 (N.D. Tex. 1978), aff'd 632 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. Tex. 1980),
reh'g granted 634 F.2d 1008 (5th Cir. Tex. 1980) (applying Texas law)
(death caused by design defect of a car) (holding that multiple awards
were permissible because "present tort law accepts the idea that
manufacturers should be checked by deterrent based remedies," at 962;
" [i] f a manufacturer's conduct has indeed been so callous, its plight
warrants no sympathy," at 963); Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 155
Cal
.
Rptr. 843, 857-59 (Cal . Ct . App . 1979) (action against insurer for
failure to pay an uninsured motorist claim by plaintiff who was insured
by the company. Although there were other actions involving identical
issues pending against the company multiple awards by several juries
were permissible, judicial control in the form of a remittitur was held
to be sufficient to avoid overkill)
.
IV. FINAL CONCLUSION;
Taking into account the measures taken against punitive
damages, there certainly is a trend to restrict them. On the
other hand, even the unsuccessful attempt to restrict them
by federal statute reflected notions of punishment and
deterrence, indicating that the legislature remains commit-
ted to preserve the punitive component of punitive damages
to some extent
.
When looking at decisions of those courts which have
declared that the purpose of punitive damages is to punish
and deter, one finds that some of them disregard this very
statement when dealing with punitive damages in practice.
Though there is a consensus that insurance coverage of
punitive damages founded upon intentional conduct of the
defendant is void, some jurisdictions allow coverage of
punitive damages for reckless or grossly negligent miscon-
duct, thereby reducing the sanction for the tortfeasor to an
indirect one. On the other hand, they apparently make this
decision in order to remedy some of the uncertainty which
the lack of a clear standard for awarding punitive damages
has created, while recognizing the concept of punishment and
deterrence
.
Likewise, some courts act inconsistently with their own
theories in using an excessive ratio of punitive damages to
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compensatory damages as the basis for overturning a jury's
verdict. But they mitigate this deviation by additionally
using other, culpability-related factors. The recent Supreme
Court decision in BMW of North America366 one the one hand
approves this proportionality approach, but on the other
hand emphasizes that culpability is to be the most important
factor.
In mass tort litigation cases, most courts rather
endanger the compensation of future plaintiffs than to
sacrifice the punishment and deterrence provided by punitive
damages in the instant case. Though they might do that for
lack of a mechanism which would allow to take the total
amount of punitive damages awarded into account when
deciding about an individual verdict, the fact that the
scales tip in favor of punishment when punishment and
compensation conflict with each other indicates that the
notion of punishment and deterrence is still being valued by
the courts.
Adopting the statement of Ellis367 that this notion
depends on moral theory and can not be tested empirically, I
chose as the initial question whether in modern times there
was a social consensus to reject the notion as outdated. But
though this notion is being criticized, and though the
courts do not always apply it consistently, their decisions
show by no means a consensus to reject it. Rather one
366 See supra note 320 and accompanying text
367 Ellis, supra note 181, at 4.
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apparently wants to limit some unwanted economical conse-
quences which the concept has created.
Similarly, the Roman Law modified, but did not
eliminate, the punitive element altogether, not even after
the distinction between private and criminal proceedings
developed. Likewise, it has been discussed that other
cultures did not know a linear development from stricter to
more lenient remedies
.
How will the situation be in 500 years? Will American
students in the year 2496 still study punitive damages in
their tort classes? We can not tell. The only statement
which can be made is that there is no evidence that punitive
damages can not play an important role in a developed
society.
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